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STT is imposed on every (i) occurrence of any ‘transfer’ event (ii) of a ‘security’ (iii) that results in a 
change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in that ‘security’, unless that ‘transfer’ event constitutes the issue of a 
security or the cancellation or redemption of a security of a company that is being wound up, liquidated, 
deregistered or finally terminated. However, the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ is not defined in the 
STT Act and the intended scope and meaning of the concepts of a ‘security’ and a ‘transfer’ event are 
not necessarily clear from their definitions in the STT Act. This may result in practical difficulties. 
This minor dissertation primarily seeks to investigate and clarify the practical scope and meaning of the 
requirements for the imposition of STT.  
In this regard, the key finding arising from the research presented in this minor dissertation is that no 
STT will be imposed on a transaction involving an uncertificated share in the absence of registration of 
that share in the transferee’s name in accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act, 2008, 
even if that transaction results in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in that share.  This is due to the fact 
that the imposition of STT requires the transfer of a share, which will only occur upon compliance with 
certain procedural requirements contained in the Companies Act, 2008. 
This minor dissertation also seeks to apply the requirements for the imposition of STT in the context of 
a share repurchase and determine whether the differing views regarding the mechanics of a share 
repurchase result in different STT outcomes.  
There is currently no uniform tax treatment of a share repurchase and legal commentators and SARS 
have divergent views on the mechanics of a share repurchase. In particular, there is no certainty 
whether a repurchased share is cancelled in the shareholder’s hands due to its repurchase, or whether 
it is re-acquired and cancelled by the repurchasing company. In the context of the STT Act, it is therefore 
unclear whether a repurchase consists of a single ‘transfer’ event or two ‘transfer’ events (that can 
potentially result in double STT).    
In this regard, a further key finding is that, notwithstanding the inconsistency in views between legal 
commentators and SARS regarding the mechanics of a share repurchase, the requirements for the 
imposition of STT can be interpreted in such a way that both views result in a single STT charge on a 
share repurchase. However, as both interpretations result in practical anomalies, it is recommended 
that the mechanics and treatment of a share repurchase be clarified through definitive guidance or 
legislative amendments in order to provide certainty, and eliminate the perceived inconsistency, in the 








CSD    - Central Securities Depository  
CGT    - Capital Gains Tax 
Companies Act, 1973  - Companies Act No 61 of 1973 
Companies Act, 2008  - Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
Income Tax Act  - Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
JSE    - Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
SARS    - South African Revenue Service 
SARS CGT Guide   - Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax  
SARS Dividends Tax Guide - Comprehensive Guide to Dividends Tax 
Strate    - Share Transactions Totally Electronic 
STT    - Securities Transfer Tax 
STT Act   - Securities Transfer Tax Act No.25 of 2007 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Share transactions have become common-place in global commerce. According to a recent study 
conducted by the World Federation of Exchanges, the total number of trades conducted on international 
exchanges during 2016 amounted to approximately 20.2 billion, while the value of share trading 
worldwide during 2016 amounted to approximately USD 84.2 trillion.1 
Therefore, taxing these transactions is an attractive source of revenue for revenue authorities globally. 
South Africa is no different and currently the transfer of securities is subject to securities transfer tax 
(‘STT’), which was implemented from 1 July 2008 under the Securities Transfer Tax Act, No. 25 of 2007 
(‘STT Act’). 
However, taxation of these transactions is not a recent development in South Africa. With World War II 
drawing to a close, governments desperately needed money to settle debts and repair their economies. 
Amongst other measures, taxation was one of the preferred tools for achieving this objective.2 However, 
the Legislature was aware that raising income tax rates would have had a negative socio-economic 
impact and, perhaps more importantly, unfavourable political consequences. Government therefore 
considered indirect ways of broadening the tax base to bolster revenue, resulting in a tax on the transfer 
of shares. 
This was initially implemented in the form of Marketable Securities Tax imposed under the Marketable 
Securities Tax Act, No. 32 of 1948 (‘MST Act’), which was payable by stockbrokers on behalf of clients 
in respect of purchases of marketable securities at a rate of 0,25% of the consideration. Some securities 
such as bonds were exempted, but marketable securities tax applied to share transactions. 
Over the course of 1999 – 2001, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (‘JSE’) implemented a decision to 
introduce a new ‘paperless’ system to deal with the settlement of share trades on the JSE (in other 
words, listed shares), namely Strate (Share Transactions Totally Electronic). This system provided for 
the dematerialisation of securities listed on the JSE in a Central Securities Depository (‘CSD’) and 
electronic settlement of trades via the Strate system. This resulted in a need for new tax legislation to 
accommodate paperless settlement of trades in shares listed on the JSE. In this regard, the 
Uncertificated Securities Tax Act, No. 31 of 1998 (‘UST Act’) replaced the Stamp Duties Act, No. 77 of 
1968 (‘Stamp Duties Act’) as far as unlisted uncertificated securities were concerned and the MST Act 
as far as listed uncertificated securities were concerned3 and provided for uncertificated securities tax 
on any issue or change in beneficial ownership of any listed securities at a rate of 0,25%.  As the 
dematerialisation of a company’s shares became a requirement for listing on the JSE,4 a situation arose 
                                                             
1 WFE Annual Statistics Guide 2016 available at https://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/statistics/annual-statistics 
(last visited 18/01/2017). 
2 ‘Second World War and its impact, 1939 – 1948’ available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/second-world-war-and-its-
impact-1939-1948 (last visited 18/01/2018). 
3 Explanatory Memorandum on the Uncertificated Securities Tax Bill, 1998, 22. 




where transfers of listed securities were governed by the UST Act, while transfers of unlisted securities 
were governed by the Stamp Duties Act. As a result, the Legislature decided to consolidate the rules 
governing listed and unlisted securities so as to provide for the levying of a single tax in respect of any 
transfer of a security, whether it is listed or unlisted. Accordingly, the STT Act abolished UST5 and 
replaced stamp duty insofar as it applied in respect of the transfer of securities,6 with effect from 1 July 
2008. 
In terms of the STT Act,7 STT is leviable on every ‘transfer’ of a ‘security’ issued by a company 
incorporated inside the Republic. The phrase ‘transfer’ is defined in section 1 of the STT Act so as to 
include various ‘transfer’ events that constitute the ’transfer’ of a ‘security’, excluding the following: 
 any of the listed ‘transfer’ events to the extent that it does not result in a change in beneficial 
ownership; 
 the issue of a security; or 
 a cancellation or redemption of a security if the company which issued the security is being 
wound up, liquidated or deregistered or its corporate existence is being finally terminated. 
Accordingly, STT is imposed on the occurrence of any ‘transfer’ event of a ‘security’ that results in a 
change in ‘beneficial ownership’ of that security. From the above, the following three requirements, or 
‘triggers’, for the imposition of STT can be identified: 
 there must be a ‘transfer’ event in relation to a security; 
 the ‘transfer’ event must result in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in that security; and  
 the ‘transfer’ event must relate to a ‘security’ and result in a transfer of that ‘security’. 
1.2 Problem statement 
As mentioned above, the STT Act provides for the payment of tax on any ‘transfer’ (as defined in the 
STT Act) of a ‘security’, such as a share in a company. In terms of this definition, a ‘transfer’ specifically 
excludes an event that does not result in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ of the ‘security’. However, 
the meaning, and application, of the concepts of a ‘transfer’, ‘security’ and ‘beneficial ownership’ for 
STT purposes aren’t always clear and thus results in practical difficulties. By way of example: The 
Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act, No. 26 of 2007 (‘STT Admin Act’) requires STT to be paid 
and an electronic declaration to be submitted (i) in the case of the transfer of a listed share, by the 14th 
day of the month following the month when the STT became payable8 or (ii) in the case of an unlisted 
share, within two months from the end of the month when the STT became payable9 (‘submission date’). 
                                                             
5 Section 11 of the STT Act. 
6 Section 25(1)(a) of the Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act No. 36 of 2007. 
7 Section 2 read with the definition of ‘transfer’ in section 1 of the STT Act. 
8 Section 3(1)(a) and (b) read with section 3(2) of the STT Admin Act. 




The STT becomes payable upon the occurrence (‘transfer date’) of a ‘transfer’ of a ‘security’ that results 
in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ of that ‘security’ and does not constitute any of the other exclusions 
from the definition of ‘transfer’ for STT purposes.10 However, in the absence of an understanding of the 
meaning of the above phrases, the transfer date - and therefore also the submission date - cannot be 
accurately established. 
This dissertation therefore primarily seeks to investigate and clarify the practical scope and meaning of 
the requirements for the imposition of STT as contained in the definition of a ‘transfer’ in the STT Act. 
This includes an investigation into:  
 the scope and meaning of the various ‘transfer’ events listed in the definition of ‘transfer’,  
 the scope and meaning of a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ as contemplated in the definition 
of ‘transfer’; and 
 the scope and meaning of the term ‘security’, as defined in the STT Act, and what would 
constitute the ‘transfer’ of that security, in the context of the definition of ‘transfer’ in the STT 
Act. 
In addition, the dissertation seeks to apply the findings in respect of the above requirements to a share 
repurchase. Share repurchases occur on a regular basis and serve important commercial purposes. 
For that reason, it has been specifically recognised in the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008.11 
Consequently, certainty as to the tax cost of a share repurchase is essential. In applying the 
requirements to a share repurchase, the dissertation will therefore compare the SARS approach as to 
mechanics of a share repurchase with the corporate law position as illustrated by the provisions of the 
Companies Act, 2008 and legal commentators. In this regard, the dissertation will consider whether the 
differing views result in different STT outcomes and whether the STT consequences of a share 
repurchase need to be clarified through legislative intervention.  
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research method followed is qualitative research of a doctrinal nature. The particular method will 
involve an analysis of domestic legislation, government publications, domestic case law and a study 
and review of literature and published articles relating to identified requirements for the imposition of 
STT. 
Since South African courts are constitutionally obliged to prefer any reasonable interpretation of any 
legislation consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation, the interpretation of the 
term ‘beneficial owner’ also will include a consideration of the outcomes of prominent international cases 
dealing with the subject. 
                                                             
10 Section 2(1) of the STT Act. 




Due to the fact that the concepts are of a technical interpretational nature, an empirical study will not 
be appropriate.  
1.4 Limitations of scope 
A ‘security’ is defined in section 1 of the STT Act as ‘any share or depository receipt in a company or 
any member’s interest in a close corporation’, but specifically excludes the debt portion in respect of a 
share linked to a debenture. The scope of the definition therefore includes a share in a company, but 
can also extend to a member’s interest in a close corporation. As it has not been possible to register 
close corporations since 1 May 2011, close corporations have to a large extent become irrelevant and 
transactions involving close corporations have become increasingly infrequent. The scope of this minor 
dissertation will therefore not include a consideration of the scope and meaning of a transfer of a 
member’s interest in a close corporation. 
Furthermore, the consideration in Chapter 7 of the application of the conclusions in the chapters below 
to a share repurchase will specifically be confined to a consideration thereof in the context of a 
repurchase of ‘uncertificated’ shares.  
1.5 Chapter overview and structure 
This chapter introduced the research topic and highlighted the issues to be explored. It set out the 
objectives this dissertation aims to achieve within the boundaries of its scope and identified the 
requirements that must be met for the imposition of STT. 
Chapter 2 investigates the scope and meaning of the first requirement for the imposition of STT, being 
a ‘transfer’ event relating to a security. The chapter therefore focusses on the definition of ‘transfer’ in 
section 1 of the STT Act and considers the variety of ‘transfer’ events that can potentially constitute a 
‘transfer’ for STT purposes. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 deal with the second requirement for the imposition of STT, being a ‘change 
in beneficial ownership’. Chapter 3 investigates the meaning of the concept ‘beneficial ownership’. As 
the term is not defined for STT purposes and has not been firmly settled in a domestic context, Part A 
of Chapter 3 seeks to establish a basis for reliance on an international meaning of the term ‘beneficial 
ownership’ when interpreting the term in a South African context. On that basis it examines the relevant 
international case law in an effort to determine an appropriate international meaning of the term from a 
South African perspective. In Part B of Chapter 3, the chapter attempts to determine a domestic 
meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’, from the following sources: 
 the common law and previous case law; 
 the Companies Act, 2008; 




 current and repealed revenue legislation, including explanatory memoranda issued by 
National Treasury and Interpretation Notes issued by SARS.   
Chapter 4 investigates the practical scope and meaning of a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in a share, 
with particular focus on the extent to which (i) the granting of a ‘beneficial interest’ as contemplated in 
the Companies Act, 2008 will result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ and (ii) a change in ‘beneficial 
ownership’ requires compliance with any prescribed procedural requirements. 
Chapter 5 investigates the scope and meaning of the third requirement for the imposition of STT. Firstly, 
it seeks to establish a clearer practical scope and meaning of the term ‘security’ as defined in section 1 
of the STT Act, with due regard to the scope limitation set out in 1.4 above. In addition, it seeks to 
determine whether there are any specific requirements that must be complied with for a ‘transfer of a 
share’ to occur for STT purposes.  
Chapter 6 attempts to formulate a practical delineation of the requirements for the imposition of STT 
from the conclusions drawn in the prior chapters. 
Chapter 7 seeks to apply the requirements for the imposition of STT from the conclusions drawn in the 
prior chapters to a share repurchase, with specific reference to the mechanics of a share repurchase. 
In particular, Chapter 7 will examine the mechanics of a share repurchase under the Companies Act 
No. 61 of 1973 and Companies Act, 2008 from a corporate law perspective, compare it with SARS’ 
apparently divergent approach to a share repurchase, comment on the difficulties in applying the 
requirements in the context of each of the divergent approaches and conclude on whether they result 
in different STT consequences. To achieve that purpose, the chapter will also investigate the mechanics 
of a share redemption and consider whether there is a basis for share redemptions and share 
repurchases to be treated similarly for tax purposes.  




CHAPTER 2: ‘TRANSFER’ EVENTS FOR STT PURPOSES 
The first requirement for the imposition of STT is the ‘transfer’ of a security that results in a change in 
‘beneficial ownership’ of that security. Accordingly, this chapter considers the meaning of ‘transfer’ for 
STT purposes.  
The term ‘transfer’ is defined in the STT Act so as to include any of the following ‘transfer’ events:12 
 the ‘transfer’ of a security; 
 the ‘sale’ of a security; 
 the ‘assignment’ of a security;  
 the ‘cession’ of a security;  
 the ‘cancellation’ of a security; 
 the ‘redemption’ of a security; 
 the ‘disposal in any other manner’ of a security. 
The various ‘transfer’ events listed above can all potentially result in a ‘transfer’ for STT purposes, 
provided they relate to a ‘security’ (as defined in the STT Act) and result in both a ‘change in beneficial 
ownership’ of that ‘security and a transfer of that ‘security’. The meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ and 
‘change in beneficial ownership’ is discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively, while the scope 
and meaning of ‘security’ (and the transfer thereof) is discussed in Chapter 5. 
As the ordinary scope and meaning of the particular ‘transfer’ events listed above doesn’t form the bone 
of contention from an STT perspective, a detailed investigation into their commercial meanings fall 
outside the scope of this dissertation. Suffice to say that, to the extent that they may be contentious, 
the wide-ranging definition of ‘transfer’ in any event includes ‘the disposal [of a security] in any other 
manner’ than the other listed ‘transfer’ events. While the phrase ‘disposal in any other manner’ is not 
defined in the STT Act, Olivier states that a ‘disposal’ is so widely defined for capital gains tax (‘CGT’) 
purposes that ‘it bears no relation to what is commercially or even legally regarded as a disposal’.13 
Based on the wide interpretation of the term ‘disposal’, any ‘action or process of getting rid of’ a security 
in any manner should constitute a ‘transfer’ event for STT purposes.14 The reference to ‘disposal in any 
other manner’ therefore effectively serves as a ‘catch all’ clause to ensure that any type of transaction, 
irrespective of its legal nature or classification, in terms whereof a person parts with, or ‘gets rid of’ a 
security, will constitute a ‘transfer’ event that could result in the imposition of STT.  
                                                             
12 See the definition of ‘transfer’ in section 1 of the STT Act. 
13 Olivier, L. 2007. ‘Determining a taxable capital gain or an assessed capital loss: some problems’. Meditari Accountancy 
Research, 15 (1), 43. 




CHAPTER 3: MEANING OF ‘BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP’ FOR STT PURPOSES 
The second requirement for the imposition of STT is that the ‘transfer’ event (as discussed under 
Chapter 2) must result in a ‘change in “beneficial ownership”’ in the security that is transferred. In order 
to determine the meaning of the phrase ‘change in beneficial ownership’, it is first necessary to 
determine the meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’. Accordingly, this chapter investigates the 
meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes, so as to assist in the determination of the 
meaning of the phrase ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in Chapter 4. 
The phrase ‘beneficial ownership’ is however not defined in the STT Act. Therefore, its meaning in a 
domestic context must be determined in accordance with the established rules of interpretation and 
with reference to case law and other legislation in a tax law context. In particular, the principles of 
company law will also have to be considered to ascertain whether a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ 
takes place.15  
The meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ is particularly relevant from an international tax 
perspective, especially in the context of articles of the Double Tax Treaties (‘DTA’s’) dealing with 
dividends, interest and royalties. This is the case, as these articles typically require a particular party to 
be the ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividend, interest or royalty under consideration in order to be entitled 
to the benefit of the applicable article (generally in the form of a reduced or zero rate of withholding 
tax).16  
Accordingly, this chapter falls to be discussed in two parts: 
 Part A examines the international tax meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’, in terms of 
international case law and the applicability thereof to South Africa in a domestic context.  
 Part B attempts to glean a domestic meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ from previous 
case law, company law, current and repealed legislation, explanatory memoranda issued by 
National Treasury and Interpretation Notes issued by SARS. It also proposes an interpretation 
of the term for purposes of the STT Act that appears to be consistent with previous 
jurisprudence, the Legislature and SARS’ view on the subject, as well as the international case 
law considered in Part A. 
  
                                                             
15 Schoon, AD. 2011. ‘The tax effect of shares-for-future services’. LLM Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 61. 
16 Helmer, G. 2012. ‘Beneficial ownership – a looming disaster?’ available at https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/tax/tax-




PART A: Meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ in terms of international case law and 
applicability to South Africa 
Section 233 of the Constitution17 requires South African courts to prefer any reasonable interpretation 
of any legislation consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law. As DTA’s are part of international law, any ‘international meaning’ of ‘beneficial 
ownership’ for purposes of double tax agreements in general (if one is ascertainable), will have to be 
considered and applied by South African courts. Whether the directive of section 233 of the Constitution 
regarding the application of an ‘international meaning’ of ‘beneficial ownership’ extends to a situation 
where a court is tasked with interpreting domestic legislation such as the STT Act, is less clear.18  While 
the issue has not authoritatively been addressed, indications are that ‘a more uniform international 
meaning’ of ‘beneficial ownership’ may be preferred by our courts, for the sake of uniformity.19 
On that basis, international case law has at least persuasive value in South African courts, even though 
South African courts are not bound thereby.20 This has been the case in practice, as foreign judgments 
are often referred to and even quoted in South African courts.21  
Although South Africa’s characterisation of the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ is not narrative, it 
appears to have similar elements to those of developed and developing nations. The similarities are 
indicative of an intended alignment with international tax norms and it is therefore submitted that, 
although international decisions only hold persuasive value in South Africa, it may be beneficial for 
South Africa to draw on the meaning of the concept from the domestic law of other countries as they 
can provide a useful framework for determining whether or not a recipient of an amount is the ‘beneficial 
owner’ thereof.22 It has also been suggested that, as the approach of the Canadian courts (and other 
courts, as will be shown below) with regards to the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ are considered 
rationally sound, South African courts could adopt a similar view, notwithstanding the fact that those 
cases dealt with the meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ in the context of DTA’s.23 
A summary of the main findings and principles distilled from the relevant international case law is set 
out in Part A of Chapter 3 below. Note that a more detailed breakdown of the background facts, 
arguments presented and findings made in those cases is contained in Annexure A. The comments 
and conclusions set out in Part A of Chapter 3 below should therefore be read in conjunction with the 
relevant case summaries in Annexure A. 
                                                             
17 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
18 De Koker, A.P. and Williams, R.C. Silke on International Tax (electronic version). LexisNexis, 9.13. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kruger, D. 2012. ‘Who is a Beneficial Owner?’. Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly 3(1), 14. See also Engelbrecht, W.A. 
2013. ‘A Critical Analysis of the Meaning of Beneficial Owner of Dividend Income Received by a Discretionary Trust’. M. Acc 
Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 9. 
21 Koorowlay, T. 2013. ‘The Commonalities or Divergence of the Meaning of Beneficial Owner in a Treaty (International) and 
Domestic Context’. M. Com Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 66. 
22 Koorowlay, 64. 
23 Louw, H. 2012. ‘Dividend tax and trusts – who needs to pay?’ available at 




3.1 Canadian case law 
3.1.1 Prévost Car Inc. v Her Majesty The Queen24  
In Prévost, the Court remarked as follows in determining the meaning of the term ‘beneficial owner’ for 
purposes of the Canada/Netherlands DTA: 
 The ‘beneficial owner’ of a dividend is the person who:25 
o ‘receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment’; 
o ‘assumes the risk and control of the dividend’; 
o ‘enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership’; 
o ‘is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the dividend income’; 
o ‘could do with the dividend what he or she desires’. 
 The shareholders of a corporation are not automatically the ‘beneficial owners’ of the assets or 
income earned by that corporation;26 
 The shareholders of a corporation receiving a dividend will only be the ‘beneficial owners’ of 
that dividend to the extent that ‘the corporation is a conduit … and has absolutely no discretion 
as to the use or application’ of the funds or has ‘agreed to act on someone else’s behalf 
pursuant to that person’s instructions without any right to do other than what that person 
instructs it’ with regard to the dividend.27 
3.1.2 Velcro Canada Inc v The Queen28 
In Velcro, the Court applied the so-called ‘beneficial owners test’ as enunciated in Prévost in 
determining the ‘beneficial owner’ of royalties for purposes of the Canada/Netherlands DTA. In terms 
thereof, the Court took into account the following factors: 
 Who had possession of the payment; 
 Who had the right to use and enjoyment of the payment;  
 Who assumed economic risk in respect of the payment; 
 Who had control of the payment. 
                                                             
24 2008 TCC 231. 
25 Prévost, paragraph 100. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 




The Court further found that to the extent that there was ‘no predetermined or automatic flow through’ 
of the royalties to anyone other than the receiver of the royalty payment, it was barred from piercing the 
corporate veil and finding that anyone else was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalties, since it is only 
when there is ‘“absolutely no discretion” that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate 
veil’.29 
3.1.3 Conclusion on Canadian cases 
In summary, it now appears to be settled law in Canada that the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’ of passive 
income receipts for DTA purposes, means the person who receives the passive income for his or her 
own enjoyment and who assumes the risk and control of the passive income derived by him or her, as 
this would indicate that the recipient is not accountable to anyone else for how the passive income is to 
be dealt with.30 
As stated by Arnold, viewed together, the Velcro and Prévost cases appear to establish what has been 
termed a ‘very low threshold’ for ‘beneficial ownership’ for the purposes of Canadian tax treaties.31 This 
is the case as these judgments practically only require a shareholder to have autonomy over a portion 
of an income stream in order for it to qualify as the ‘beneficial owner’ thereof. Nevertheless, the 
decisions make it clear that a holding company will be regarded as the ‘beneficial owner’ of its property 
or income, unless that holding company has absolutely no discretion to deal with that property or income 
on its own.32  
3.2 Russian case law 
Following the recent BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting) developments relating to ‘beneficial 
ownership’, Russia embarked on the implementation of so-called ‘de-offshorization’ laws (domestically 
known as the ‘actual right to income rule’) since 1 January 2015.33 These laws essentially meant that a 
foreign company that receives income from Russia (for example, in the form of dividends, interest and 
royalties) may be refused the right to claim the lower rates of withholding tax provided for under DTA’s, 
unless they are the ‘beneficial owners’ thereof (hereinafter referred to as the ‘beneficial ownership 
concept’). While the legislative amendments introducing the ‘actual right to income rule’ only became 
effective in 2015, Russian courts have however been applying the beneficial owner concept even prior 
to this implementation date. Accordingly, these laws are merely a codification into its official legislative 
clarifications of pre-existing rules relating to the beneficial owner concept, as previously formulated by 
the Russian Ministry of Finance and applied by the Russian courts.34  
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Russian cases decided on the basis of the beneficial owner concept (whether prior or subsequent to 
the promulgation of the ‘actual right to income rule’) turn on the same legal question as the Canadian 
cases (that is to say, who the ‘beneficial owner’ of the income is) and can therefore provide a valuable 
perspective on the subject.  
3.2.1 ZAO Votek Mobile and OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom 
In both the ZAO Votek Mobile35 and OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom36 cases, the Court ruled that the 
company receiving dividends from Russia was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividends, as the entire 
dividend amount was not on-distributed by that company to its shareholder. Additionally, it was found 
in the OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom case that the recipient of the dividend appeared to conduct its 
own business activities in its jurisdiction and was not interposed as a mere conduit. 
3.2.2 Severstal PAO and OOO TD Petelino 
In the cases of Severstal PAO37 and OOO TD Petelino,38 the Court ruled that companies which received 
the income (in the former instance, in the form of dividends and in the latter case, in the form of royalties) 
from Russia were ‘conduit’ companies and did not have an actual right to the income, since: 
 payments were made soon after receiving funds from the Russian companies; 
 the shares in the Russian subsidiaries were the companies’ only asset and in Severstal PAO’s 
case dividends on those shares made up 99% of its income; 
 the companies themselves did not have the right to alienate their interests in the Russian 
subsidiaries, as their owners had the right to make that decision. 
In OOO TD Petelino’s case, the Court went so far as to disregard the intermediary company, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was entitled to royalty income under a valid sub-licensing agreement and 
ostensibly conducted genuine business operations in its jurisdiction. 
3.2.3 Conclusion on Russian cases 
It is evident that, similar to the Canadian courts, the Russian courts have focussed on whether the 
receiver of income (i) assumes any risk in respect of the income or underlying interest, (ii) has any 
discretion to determine the economic fate of the income so received or (iii) acts as a mere conduit for 
the income so received. However, in determining whether a company is simply a conduit, indications 
are that Russian courts are increasingly taking into account business substance factors such as the 
relevant company’s level of presence, business purpose and functions in another jurisdiction. 
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3.3 UK case law 
3.3.1 Indofood International Finance Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London Branch 
Although not a tax case and involving the Indonesia/Mauritius DTA rather than a UK DTA, the UK Court 
of Appeal case of Indofood International Finance Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London Branch39 
specifically considered the international meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’. 
In its dictum, the Court held that ‘the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the 
formal owner who does not have the full privilege to directly benefit from the income’.40 The Court 
proceeded to find that a party receiving an interest payment would not be the ‘beneficial owner’ thereof 
under the following circumstances:41  
 if it receives exactly the same amount of interest that it is liable to pay its investors; 
 if it does not retain any margin of the interest and does not exercise any control over the interest 
it receives; 
 it receives payment immediately before it is liable to pay its investors; and 
 if an agreement obliges it to meet its obligations in respect of its investors solely from the interest 
it receives and prohibits it from settling its obligations from any other source of funds. 
3.3.2 Conclusion and criticism against UK case law 
If one has regard to only the facts of the case (which is dealt with in more detail in Annexure A) and the 
Court’s eventual finding that the Dutch SPV’s position would have equated to that of an ‘administrator 
of income’ who derives no ‘direct benefit’ from the income,42 the question appeared to be simply whether 
or not the Dutch SPV would have constituted a mere conduit. Commentators agree that, on the facts of 
the case, the Court correctly found that the Dutch SPV would not have met the ‘very low threshold’ for 
‘beneficial ownership’ that Arnold refers to in the context of the Canadian cases.43 
However, the Court’s references to a ‘beneficial owner’ having to have ‘the full privilege to directly 
benefit from the income’,44 clearly creates a substantially higher threshold for ‘beneficial ownership’ 
than simply having to determine whether a party is a mere conduit. As a result, these references have 
been subjected to criticism from authors and scholars alike. Baker summarises the concerns as 
follows:45 
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‘The biggest difficulty with the case is not that it confirms that the proposed Dutch 
company would not have been the beneficial owner. The real difficulty is how far the 
judgment extends: what other arrangements would be held to fall foul of the BO 
limitation?’ 
Koorowlay states that the reference to those comments is unfortunate and questionable, as it implies 
that a recipient will only qualify as a ‘beneficial owner’ if such recipient holds all the rights of ownership 
associated with such income.46 Similarly, Du Toit and Hattingh state that the comments make the 
judgment a good example of a so-called ‘geleentheidsbeslissing’ in that the decision may have been 
right on the facts, but gives rise to difficulties as far as the extrapolation of a more general yet workable 
principle is concerned.47  
3.4 Concluding remarks on international case law in general 
As is evident from the aforementioned case law, no universally accepted or globally recognised 
meaning has been established for the term ‘beneficial ownership’ yet.  
As a point of departure, it appears that the ‘beneficial owner’ of an income stream or a share is to be 
found somewhere between the two extremities mentioned by Baker in his review of the Indofood case.48 
At one end of the spectrum is the person who is simply a nominee shareholder of a company. As 
established above, a mere nominee shareholder will not qualify as the ‘beneficial owner’ of income, as 
it will not be entitled to any economic benefit attaching to the income. At the other end of that spectrum, 
are persons who are eventually entitled to an economic benefit from that income, after ignoring one or 
more direct stakeholders (‘ultimate shareholders’). In the ordinary course, the benefits derived by the 
ultimate shareholders are arguably too far removed from a share for the ultimate shareholders to 
constitute the ‘beneficial owners’ of that income. If this was not the case, it would result in an untenable 
situation and would beg the question:49 
‘If a company were to be denied the benefit of a treaty (due to it not being the 
beneficial owner) because the income received might ultimately be paid on to a third 
party, then when would any company ever be entitled to the benefit of the three 
central provisions of most tax treaties?’ 
What can be condensed from the cases discussed above is that a party will not constitute the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of income to the extent that (i) it is an intermediary with absolutely no discretion with regards to 
the income it receives or (ii) the funds are pre-destined to automatically flow to a different person. On 
the other hand, it appears that a company receiving funds that has a properly constituted management 
that makes independent decisions regarding the distribution of its funds to its shareholders and 
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conducts its own income-generating business activities will constitute the ‘beneficial owner’ of the 
income so received. 
According to Meyer, the focus is that the recipient of income operates ‘in such a way as if it is 
independent and has operational and economical substance’.50 Accordingly, he is of the view that, ‘in 
proving that a company is not merely an intermediary, one might need to prove that the company has 
a fixed place of business located in that country, is suitably staffed with managerial and operational 
employees and has suitable equipment and facilities available for conducting the primary operations of 
that business’.51 Likewise, Van Bladel reasons that ‘beneficial ownership requires 100% legal ownership 
and a certain degree of economic risk’ in the income.52 While recipients who adhere to the guidance of 
Meyer and Van Bladel will most likely comfortably satisfy the requirements for ‘beneficial ownership’, 
these guidelines lend themselves to the stricter approach to ‘beneficial ownership’ followed in the 
Indofood and recent Russian cases, rather than the lower threshold established by the Canadian cases.  
In this regard, it must be noted that Indofood was heard by a civil court, argued by counsel who had no 
tax expertise and decided by judges who were not tax experts, without any representation from a 
revenue authority. On the other hand, the Canadian cases have been described as ‘sound’ decisions 
by local commentators53 and were decided by a tax court.54 Furthermore, the Russian legal system is 
based on the civil law model, while both the Canadian and South African legal system is based on the 
common law model and follows the stare decisis doctrine.55 Decisions in common law countries 
generally carry more weight because of the style of judicial writing and English language materials are 
more easily accessible.56 It is therefore submitted that the Canadian cases will arguably have a greater 
influence on a South African court saddled with the responsibility of determining the domestic meaning 
of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ than either Indofood or the more recent Russian cases.57  
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PART B: Meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ in terms of South African domestic law 
3.5 Common law 
In the context of South African common law, the term ‘beneficial ownership’ is an inconvenient label 
that fits uncomfortably into the South African legal mould. This is mainly due to the fact that the term 
has its origins in English law of equity, which was never incorporated into South African domestic law.58 
It is on this basis that it was noted in Braun v Blann and Botha NNO59 that ‘[T]he English conception of 
an equitable ownership distinct from, but coexisting with, the legal ownership is foreign to our law' and 
that Borrowdale stated that ‘ownership of shares in South African law is completely distinct from, 
although frequently co-extensive with, the registered title to shares’.60 
The inconvenience of the label is well-illustrated by Du Toit, Hattingh and Borrowdale. Du Toit and 
Hattingh state that, generally speaking, 'things' are simply 'owned'; and a person can therefore not claim 
'beneficial ownership’ simultaneously and separately with another person’s ownership of the same 
thing. Furthermore, they state that personal rights are typically not 'owned', but rather ‘held’. Based on 
the fact that a share denotes a bundle of personal rights, it follows that such rights are ‘held’, rather 
than ‘owned’.61 Borrowdale describes the inconvenience created by the disjuncture of the ‘ownership’ 
of the rights which constitute the share (that is to say, ‘beneficial ownership’) and the ability to exercise 
or enforce those rights (that is to say, registered title of the share) as follows:62 
‘[A]n unsatisfactory position is created involving two sets of obligations neither of 
which can be identified with ownership: (1) the rights which the nominee possesses 
as against the company arising by virtue of his registration and which he alone can 
enforce; and (2) the rights of the owner against the nominee created by the 
agreement of agency between them. Since the shares consist of the rights in (1) and 
ownership is founded on the rights in (2), there exists in effect a separation of 
ownership from the subject-matter.’ 
Therefore, in a domestic context, the reference to ‘beneficial ownership’ is actually a misnomer in that 
a person can be beneficially entitled to one or more of the benefits or rights comprising a share by virtue 
of 'holding' those rights or benefits, without having to be the owner thereof. In this regard it has been 
suggested that it may be more appropriate to refer to someone being the person that has ‘the beneficial 
entitlement’ to a dividend, interest or royalty payment, rather than being the ‘beneficial owner’ thereof.63 
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Nevertheless, a distinction is often drawn between the ‘beneficial ownership’ and registered ownership 
of a share by South African courts, especially in a corporate law context. In essence, this distinction 
recognises the fact that one party can be the registered owner of a share, while a different party can be 
entitled to the rights attaching to that share. Generally, the latter party is referred to as the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of the shares.64 This distinction between registered ownership and ‘beneficial ownership’ of a 
share was first recognised by the Appellate Division in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd,65 where it was held that:66 
‘A nominee is an agent with limited authority: he holds shares in name only. He does 
this on behalf of his nominator or principal, from whom he takes his instructions; …. 
The principal, whose name does not appear on the register, is usually described as 
the 'beneficial owner'. This is not, juristically speaking, wholly accurate; but it is a 
convenient and well-understood label.’  
The principles enunciated in Oakland Nominees above were again confirmed in Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others,67 where this distinction between 
registered ownership and ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share was described as follows:68 
‘Normally the person in whom the share vests is the registered shareholder in the 
books of the company and has issued to him a share certificate specifying the share, 
or shares, held by him. . . [I]n some instances, however, the registered shareholder 
may hold the shares as the nominee, i.e. agent, of another, generally described as 
the “owner” or “beneficial owner” of the shares. This fact does not appear on the 
company’s register, as it is the policy of the law that a company should concern itself 
only with the registered owner of the shares [. . .] The term “beneficial owner” is, 
juristically speaking, not wholly accurate, but it is a convenient and well used label 
to denote the person in whom, as between himself and the registered shareholder, 
the benefit of the bundle of rights constituting the share vests.’  
Corbett JA, who delivered the judgment, went on to state reasons why a person will be considered to 
be a ‘beneficial owner’:69 
‘…There is no doubt, to my mind, that prior to the sale to Ocean the Harris brothers 
were, as alleged by them, the beneficial owners of the external securities registered 
in the name of Standard Bank Nominees and held by Standard Bank SEB. It was 
they who had provided the capital necessary for the acquisition of the shares; 
dividends declared on the shares were remitted to them; shareholders’ rights, such 
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as, for example, the right to vote at company meetings, were, it seems, exercised by 
the nominee company on instructions from the Harris brothers; and it was they who 
determined when and in what manner switches of external securities were to be 
made.’ 
A similar reasoning was adopted in May and Others v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe,70 where the Court 
made the following obiter statement with regard to the ownership of the securities:71  
‘… I am of the opinion that the applicants were the owners of the securities, even 
though they were not registered in their names but as required by the law in this case 
in the names of nominees. The nominees did not pay for the securities; they could 
not dispose of the securities; they had to follow the instructions of the applicants in 
exercising any votes attaching to the shares; any dividends received had to be paid 
to the applicants and the applicants could change the nominees at any time.’ 
This distinction was also recognised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the context of a trust in Yarram 
Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd.72 In that case it had to be determined whether the 
respondent had the necessary locus standi to institute eviction proceedings in respect of leased 
premises which was registered in the Deeds Office in the respondent’s name, in its capacity as 'the 
trustees for the time being of the Allan Gray Property Trust Collective Investment Scheme’ (‘scheme 
trust’). In finding that the respondent, as duly registered owner of the property and ‘trustee’ of the 
scheme trust, did in fact have the requisite legal standing to apply for an eviction order relating the 
leased premises, the Court ruled that the respondent held the ‘bare ownership’ (or ‘legal ownership’) of 
the scheme trust’s assets, while the beneficiaries of the scheme trust (that is to say, the investors in the 
scheme) were the ‘beneficial owners’ thereof. In particular, the Court held (with reference to the trustee 
of a trust) that:73 
‘His title is usually described as 'bare ownership' ('nudum dominium') – sometimes 
also called 'legal ownership' – while 'beneficial ownership' ('utile dominium') is said 
to vest in the beneficiaries of the trust ... In short, the provisions of the Act and the 
Deed are, in my view, quite clear: upon registration in its name, qua trustee, the 
respondent became the 'legal owner' of the property and holds it in trust for the 
investors as 'beneficial owners'. 
Recently, the distinction between a ‘nominee’ and ‘beneficial owner’ of a share was re-affirmed in Sino 
West Shipping Co. Limited v Nyk-Hinode Line Limited74,75 again with reference to the Oakland 
Nominees case. In that case, application was made to the KwaZulu-Natal High Court to set aside the 
arrest of the vessel MV Sino West as security for damages arising from the sinking of the MV Asian 
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Forest.  In terms of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act76 (‘Admiralty Act’), to obtain security for 
contemplated or pending proceedings, a party must demonstrate that it has a claim against a ship which 
is an associated ship of the ship concerned.77 The respondent averred that, at the time when its claim 
arose against the applicant, it was controlled by the same person who also controlled Sino West 
Shipping Company Limited (‘CWS Co’) at the time of the arrest of the Sino West vessel. Accordingly, 
the respondent alleged that the Sino West vessel was an associated ship of the Asian Forest vessel for 
purposes of the Admiralty Act.  
The Court proceeded to find that, for purposes of the Admiralty Act, the same person ‘controlled’ the 
applicant and CWS Co - in the former case due to him effectively being the ‘beneficial owner’ of the 
applicant’s shares and in the latter due to him being the nominee shareholder of the shares. More 
significantly, the Court noted in passing that the term ‘beneficial ownership’ is a label denoting the 
person in whom the benefit of the bundle of rights constituting a share vests.78 
It is therefore evident that, at least for corporate law purposes, it has become an established practice 
to distinguish between the registered holder of a share on the one hand, and the ‘beneficial owner’ 
thereof on the other; and that the registered owner of a share is not necessarily the ‘beneficial owner’ 
of that share, and vice versa. However, it should be borne in mind that South African courts have thus 
far recognised this distinction mainly for purposes of developing procedural remedies in instances 
where public policy appears to have required the courts to do so.79 On this basis, Hattingh notes that 
the cases mentioned above simply use the term ‘beneficial ownership’ as a label or ‘practical descriptive 
concept’, rather than recognising it as a legal notion with specific well-defined legal consequences.80 
This aligns with Borrowdale’s view that:81 
‘… despite the inaccuracy of the term [beneficial ownership] and its association with 
the concept of equitable title in English law, it is nevertheless widely used in South 
African decisions to refer to the unregistered title to shares.’ 
It is submitted that the same rings true in respect of the obiter remark regarding ‘beneficial ownership’ 
in Sino West. While the Court arguably intended to confirm the apparent meaning that was previously 
established in Oakland Nominees and Ocean Commodities, the judgment arguably does not 
significantly contribute to the further delineation of the definition or content of the term, other than 
possibly suggesting that one should also take into account whether a particular party can exercise 
                                                             
76 Act No. 105 of 1983. 
77 Section 5(3) of the Admiralty Act. 
78 Sino West, paragraph 68. 
79 Silke on International Tax, 9.10. For example, in Oakland Nominees the Court found that that the ‘beneficial owner’ of stolen 
shares was procedurally entitled to directly enforce 'ownership' of its shares, and needed not engage his nominee to do so, in 
circumstances were a third person threatened the position by claiming title to those shares. Likewise, the Court ruled in Ocean 
Commodities that, procedurally, a beneficial owner’s claim for delivery of shares is based on a cause of action that is analogous 
to that of rei vindicatio.  
80 Ibid. 




‘control’ over a company when determining whether he is the ‘beneficial owner’ of that company’s 
shares. 
3.6 Companies Act, 2008 
The distinction between a legal owner and ‘beneficial owner’ of a share is seemingly also recognised 
and regulated by the Companies Act, 2008. While the term ‘beneficial ownership’ is not defined 
therein, the Companies Act, 2008 requires the disclosure of any ‘beneficial interest’ held in respect of 
a share.82 A ‘beneficial interest’ is defined as follows: 
‘“beneficial interest”’, when used in relation to a company’s securities, means the 
right or entitlement of a person, through ownership, agreement, relationship or 
otherwise, alone or together with another person to –  
(a) receive or participate in any distribution in respect of the company’s 
securities; 
(b) exercise or cause to be exercised, in the ordinary course, any or all of the 
rights attaching to the company’s securities; or  
(c) dispose or direct the disposition of the company’s securities, or any part of a 
distribution in respect of the securities, 
but does not include any interest held by a person in a unit trust or collective 
investment scheme in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Act, 2002 (Act 
45 of 2002).’ 
Notably, the term ‘beneficial interest’ does not necessarily require ownership of rights in respect of 
shares, but simply the ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to one or more of the specific benefits prescribed in (a) – 
(c) above. Prima facie, the definition of ‘beneficial interest’ therefore appears to extend beyond a literal 
interpretation of the term ‘beneficial ownership’, in that a ‘beneficial interest’ does not necessarily require 
‘ownership’ per se of any of the rights attaching to the share. Furthermore, it is ostensibly possible to 
have more than one beneficial interest holder in a share, while typically only a single ‘beneficial owner’ 
is recognised in respect of a share.83  In this regard it is stated in Henochsberg that the ‘beneficial holder 
of securities and holder of a beneficial interest are not the same’,84 since the ‘beneficial owner’ of a 
share would be the holder of all the rights that could individually qualify as a beneficial interest in that 
share.85 Likewise, Rachlitz states that the term ‘beneficial interest’ must be distinguished from the legal 
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concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ since ‘there can be many persons who hold a beneficial interest in one 
and the same share’.86 
While the scope of the term ‘beneficial interest’ therefore extends beyond the scope of the term 
‘beneficial ownership’, the concepts are not mutually exclusive and, as set out in Chapter 6, may overlap 
to the extent that a person acquires a beneficial interest in respect of all the rights that comprise a share. 
3.7 JSE Equity Rules 
Part of the regulatory framework that governs the JSE, is the JSE Equity Rules.87 According to the JSE 
Equity Rules, a ‘beneficial owner’ of a security is a person whose securities are held in the name of a 
registered owner acting as a nominee for that person and in whom the benefits of the bundle of rights 
attaching to that share vest. The definition further states that these rights are ‘typically evidenced by 
one or more of … (a) the right or entitlement to receive any dividend or interest payable in respect of 
those equity securities; (b) the right to exercise or cause to be exercised in the ordinary course of 
events, any or all of the voting, conversion, redemption or other rights attached to those equity 
securities; (c) the right to dispose or direct the disposition of those equity securities, or any part of a 
distribution in respect of those equity securities, and to have the benefit of the proceeds.’88 
3.8 SARS’ interpretation of previous and current revenue legislation 
Even though the STT Act as primary legislation alone must be interpreted in order to determine the 
meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes, a court will give due consideration to the meaning 
of the phrase in other legislation that is administered by the Commissioner, any relevant explanatory 
memoranda89 that accompanied amendments to such legislation and any relevant Interpretation 
Notes.90 In addition, the legislative amendment history of the relevant tax legislation may provide 
additional insight and clarification on SARS’ interpretation of the phrase ‘beneficial ownership’.91 
3.8.1 Income Tax Act 
The legal distinction between registered ownership and ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share has recently 
also been acknowledged by SARS in the context of the Income Tax Act, resulting in the removal of the 
definition of ‘shareholder’ from the Income Tax Act. In the Explanatory Memorandum on Taxation Laws 
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Amendment Bill, 2011 (‘the 2011 Explanatory Memorandum’) that accompanied the removal of the 
definition of ‘shareholder’ from the Income Tax Act, it is indicated that the definition was removed 
because it created confusion by focussing on both the share register and ‘beneficial ownership’. In 
particular, it is acknowledged that the person named in the share register is not necessarily the 
‘beneficial owner’ of the share and that ‘the focus should always be on the beneficial owner of the share, 
not the registered owner.’92 In addition, SARS specifically states in Interpretation Note 6793 dealing with 
the definition of ‘connected parties’ as defined in section 1(1) of the Income Tax Act, that a person who 
is a registered shareholder and acts in a nominee capacity would not be the ‘beneficial owner’.94 
Likewise, in Interpretation Note 4395 dealing with section 9C of the Income Tax Act, SARS once again 
states that ‘[G]iven that the Act is generally concerned only with beneficial ownership, the word “owner” 
must be taken as referring to the beneficial owner’.96  
However, none of these documents provide a definition for ‘beneficial owner’. 
3.8.2 Dividends Tax 
Prior to the introduction of dividends tax, the term ‘beneficial owner’ was not defined in the Income Tax 
Act.  Thus, under the previous dividend taxing regime (that is to say, secondary tax on companies), a 
dividend was regarded as any amount distributed by a company to its ‘shareholder’. However, as set 
out above, the legal distinction between registered ownership and ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share 
resulted in the removal of the definition of ‘shareholder’ from the Income Tax Act.  
The dividends tax regime subjects cash dividends paid by a South African company to dividends tax at 
the rate of 20%97 and places the liability for the tax on the ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividend (unless an 
exemption applies).98 As a result, the introduction of the dividends tax regime was accompanied by the 
insertion of a definition of the term ‘beneficial owner’ for dividends tax purposes. In terms thereof, the 
term means ‘the person entitled to the benefit of the dividend attaching to the share’.99 
The Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the introduction of section 64D provided no further 
explanation of the ‘beneficial owner’ definition in section 64D. In the SARS Dividends Tax Guide,100 
which was subsequently issued, also does not provide much more detail in respect of the statutory 
definition, other than referring to dicta in Oakland Nominees and Prévost. Nevertheless, it confirms that 
the term ‘beneficial owner’ should not be interpreted too widely or out of context and that not every 
person that benefits from the holding of a share will necessarily be the ‘beneficial owner’ of a dividend.101 
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3.8.3 The UST Act  
Previously, the UST Act provided for UST on every change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in uncertificated 
shares.102 For purposes of the UST Act, ‘beneficial ownership’ in relation to a share was defined so as 
to include: 
 the right or entitlement to receive dividends in respect of the share; and 
 the right to exercise or cause to exercise any or all of the voting, conversion, redemption or 
other rights attaching to the share. 
In addition, the term ‘change in beneficial ownership’ was defined so as to specifically include the 
cancellation or redemption of a share, but excluded the issue of a share.103 In this regard the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2005  clarified that ‘a change in 
beneficial ownership takes place whenever securities are cancelled or redeemed, and whenever there 
is any acquisition of any of the rights or entitlements attaching to a security’.104  
Since the UST Act was repealed and replaced by the STT Act, its provisions are now obsolete. The 
extent to which its definitions would carry any authority in the interpretation of the term ‘beneficial 
ownership’, or what would constitute a change therein, for STT purposes, is therefore questionable. As 
the Legislature specifically chose not to retain the definition and intended meaning of the definitions 
when repealing the UST Act,105 it has to be anticipated that the aforementioned definitions may no 
longer correctly reflect the Legislature’s intention or the law. Nevertheless, they could well serve as an 
appropriate point of departure when determining the meaning of these previously-defined concepts.106  
3.9 Remarks on formulation of a domestic meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ 
Even though the distinction between legal ownership and ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share is recognised 
in both South African case law and legislation, there is currently no uniform statutory definition of a 
‘beneficial owner’ of shares in South African domestic legislation.  
In the absence of a statutory definition for STT purposes, regard must first and foremost be had to the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words.107 The definition specifically includes the word ‘ownership’. 
As a result of the definition used in the UST Act that referred to the ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to benefits of 
a shares not being retained in the STT Act, one is compelled to interpret the term as requiring 
‘ownership’ of the share or the rights attaching thereto. In terms of the Companies Act, 2008, a person 
can only acquire ‘ownership’ of a share, or the rights attaching to that share, in accordance with the 
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relevant CSD’s rules.108 Practically, compliance with the CSD rules will therefore result in a person 
simultaneously acquiring ownership of both the share and the rights associated therewith. On that basis, 
the registered owner of the share will in effect always also be the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share, negating 
the long-acknowledged distinction between the two concepts.109 
The domestic meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes should therefore not be 
limited to the strict literal meaning set out above, but should rather be interpreted so as to include any 
person who has a right or entitlement to the benefits attaching to that share, unless that person is an 
intermediary or ‘conduit’ with absolutely no discretion with regards to the benefits of the share. This is 
based on the following reasoning: 
 Even though regard must be had to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the phrase, regard 
must also be had to the purpose of the phrase, as well as the background and preparation of 
the STT Act.110 In this regard, the Explanatory Memorandum on the Securities Transfer Tax 
Bill, 2007 specifically stated that the ‘concept of transfer relates to economic ownership, as 
opposed to the mere registration of a security as in the case of a share registered in the name 
of a nominee. For that reason transfer excludes any event that does not result in a change in 
beneficial ownership.’111 It is therefore evident that, in line with the purpose of the STT Act, the 
meaning of the phrase should not focus on the transfer of registered ownership, but rather 
economic ownership. Notwithstanding the reference to ‘ownership’, the concept of ‘economic 
ownership’ more closely resembles the notion of ‘beneficial ownership’ that has historically been 
recognised by South African courts. In terms thereof, the reference to ‘ownership’ is a misnomer 
and simply a convenient label to describe the person who is ultimately entitled to the benefits 
attaching to a share, as opposed to the registered owner thereof.112  
 In addition, there is an apparent effort to align South Africa’s domestic legislation as far as 
‘beneficial ownership’ is concerned,113 with the focus thereof being on the person who has a 
‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to the benefits attaching to a share. For example, in the context of the 
right to dividends, the Income Tax Act recognises the person who has an entitlement to the 
benefit of the dividend as the ‘beneficial owner’ thereof for dividends tax purposes. This largely 
correlates with the meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ as enunciated in Sino West, save 
for the fact that Sino West focussed on the benefit of all the rights comprising a share and not 
only the right to dividends. Likewise, both the definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ in the repealed 
UST Act and the definition of ‘beneficial interest’ in the Companies Act, 2008 refer to ‘rights’ or 
‘entitlement’ in relation to income or an asset. 
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 There are also various indications in Explanatory Memoranda and Interpretation Notes that 
SARS will not view the registered owner of a share as the ‘beneficial owner’ of such shares, 
unless he benefits from the holding of that share. 
 An approach to the interpretation of the term ‘beneficial ownership’ that focusses on an 
‘entitlement to benefits’ rather than ‘ownership’ will adhere to the constitutional directive that 
South African courts should prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent 
with international law. 
3.10 Conclusion on meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes 
In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes, the following factors 
should be taken into account when interpreting the phrase in a domestic context: 
 regard should be had for the ordinary grammatical meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’; 
 the term must be read in the context of the overall scheme of the STT Act; 
 regard should be had for the purpose of the relevant provision against the background to the 
production of the STT Act; and  
 due regard should be had for appropriate international case law. 
Based on the international case law discussed in Part A, neither a mere nominee shareholder, nor the 
ultimate shareholders, will in the ordinary course constitute the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share. Instead, 
they will rather delineate the spectrum within which the meaning of the term has to be determined. 
Based on the guidance provided by the Canadian cases in particular, such a determination should 
involve a South African court establishing whether the person alleging ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share 
(i) receives the income from the shares for his or her own enjoyment, (ii) assumes the risk and control 
of the share and (iii) is wholly accountable to anyone else for how the share is dealt with.  
Taking into account (i) the above international meaning, (ii) the guidance provided by the various 
meanings in Part B that have been attributed to the phrase ‘beneficial ownership’ in a domestic context, 
(iii) the purpose of the STT Act of taxing only transfers of economic ownership and (iv) the fact there 
can typically be only a single ‘beneficial owner’ of a share, the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share for STT 
purposes should be that person whose right or entitlement to one or more of the benefits attaching to 






CHAPTER 4: MEANING OF ‘CHANGE IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP’ FOR STT PURPOSES 
As set out in Chapter 3, the second requirement for the imposition of STT is that the ‘transfer’ event (as 
discussed under Chapter 2) must result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in the security that is 
transferred. Accordingly, this chapter considers the scope and meaning of the phrase ‘change in 
beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes, with specific reference to the findings regarding the meaning 
of ‘beneficial ownership’ in Chapter 3. 
Previously, the term ‘change in beneficial ownership’ was defined for purposes of the UST Act and was 
intended to clarify that ‘a change in beneficial ownership takes place whenever securities are cancelled 
or redeemed, and whenever there is any acquisition of any of the rights or entitlements attaching to a 
security’.114 Even though this definition was retained in an initial version of the STT Bill, it was ultimately 
not retained in the STT Act. As a result, there is currently no legislative meaning of the phrase ‘change 
in beneficial ownership’. Nevertheless, the phrase clearly requires that a ‘transfer’ event relating to a 
‘security’ must result in either (i) a different person becoming entitled to the majority of the benefits 
attaching to that security or, at least (ii) in the transferor no longer being entitled to the majority of the 
benefits attaching to that security. 
4.1 Impact and relevance of the Companies Act, 2008 
Practically, a person cannot become the legal owner115 of a share,116 or the rights associated with an 
uncertificated share,117 in the absence of the debiting of the Securities Account of the transferor and the 
crediting of the Securities Account of that person. It is therefore evident that the same procedural 
requirement (that is to say, the debiting and crediting of the Securities Accounts of the transferor and 
transferee) applies in respect of both the acquisition of ownership of an uncertificated share and the 
acquisition of ownership of the rights associated with that uncertificated share.118 As demonstrated in 
3.9 above, the practical effect thereof is that ownership and registration of uncertificated shares cannot 
be separated119 and that the person in whose name a share is registered will become (i) the legal owner 
of the share itself, as well as (ii) the legal owner of the rights associated with that share. From a legal 
perspective this appears to be an acceptable notion, as a share consists of ‘a bundle, or conglomerate, 
of personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a certain interests in the company, its assets and 
dividends’;120 and ownership of all those rights will result in ownership of the share itself.121  
However, as concluded in Chapter 3, the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share is the person entitled to the 
benefits of the rights attaching to that share and not necessarily the legal owner thereof. Accordingly, 
while a legal transfer of an uncertificated share will automatically result in a change in ownership of the 
                                                             
114 Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2005, 78. 
115 Or ‘registered owner’ or ‘title holder’. 
116 Section 53(2) of the Companies Act, 2008. 
117 Section 37(9) of the Companies Act, 2008 read with Strate Rules 7.3.3.1 and 7.3.3.2. 
118 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 174 – 175. 
119 Rachlitz, 410. 
120 Ocean Commodities (A), 151. 
121 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 174 – 175. The authors state that the ‘acquisition of the rights associated 
with a share equals ownership of the share because the rights (or rather the competencies in respect of the rights) that 




rights comprising the share due to registration of the share in the transferee’s name in terms the 
Companies Act, 2008, such registration is not necessarily a requirement for a change in ‘beneficial 
ownership to occur’. This is the case, as the granting of a beneficial interest can also result in a change 
in ‘beneficial ownership’, which only requires disclosure and not registration.122 However, as concluded 
in Chapter 3, there can be more than one beneficial interest holder in a share, but only a single 
‘beneficial owner’ of a share - being the person whose right or entitlement to one or more of the benefits 
attaching to that share outweighs that of any other person. Accordingly, only the conferral of a beneficial 
interest that entitles the beneficial interest holder to the benefit of the majority of the rights comprising 
that share, will result in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in respect of that share. 
4.2 Conclusion 
Since a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ is one of the requirements for the imposition of STT, this 
chapter considered what is meant by this phrase in light of the findings regarding the meaning of 
‘beneficial ownership’ in Chapter 3. In addition, this chapter also considered whether registration in 
accordance with the Companies Act, 2008 is a requirement for a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ to 
occur. 
As a point of departure, the registered owner of an uncertificated share will become both the legal owner 
and the ‘beneficial owner’ of that share immediately upon registration of that share in accordance with 
the rules of the CSD. Accordingly, registration in accordance with the Companies Act, 2008 is required 
for a ‘change of beneficial ownership’ to occur in this way.  However, the granting of a beneficial interest 
in the majority of the rights attaching to that share, which does not require registration in accordance 
with the Companies Act, 2008, will also result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in that share. It 
follows that, while any transfer of legal ownership of a share (or the rights attaching to that share) which 
requires the debiting and crediting of the parties’ respective Securities Accounts in accordance with the 
Companies Act, 2008 will result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’, such registration is not a 
requirement for a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in a share.  
This position aligns with both (i) the common law distinction referred to in 3.5 above between the 
registered owner and ‘beneficial owner’ of a share and (ii) the view highlighted in 3.5 above that a 
person can be beneficially entitled to one or more of the benefits or rights comprising a share without 
having to be the owner thereof. 
 
  
                                                             




CHAPTER 5: MEANING OF ‘TRANSFER OF SECURITY’ FOR STT PURPOSES 
The third requirement for the imposition of STT is that the ‘transfer’ event (as discussed under Chapter 
2) must result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in the security that is transferred (as discussed under 
Chapters 3 and 4) and result in a ‘transfer’ of a ‘security’. 
Accordingly, this chapter considers the scope and meaning of the term ‘security’, and what would 
constitute the ‘transfer of a share’, for STT purposes. 
From a commercial perspective, the term ‘security’ usually refers to shares, but also includes 
‘debentures or other instruments, irrespective of their form or title, issued or authorised to be issued by 
a profit company’.123  For STT purposes, a ‘security’ is defined as ‘any share or depository receipt in a 
company or any member’s interest in a close corporation’, but specifically excludes the debt portion in 
respect of a share linked to a debenture.124 According to the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Securities Transfer Tax Bill, 2007, the definition of ‘security’ is intended to cover all shares in a company, 
depository receipts and all members’ interests in a close corporation, but not debts or interests in 
collective investment schemes in the form of unit trusts.125 It is therefore evident that the scope of the 
definition includes the ordinary concept of a ‘share’ and accordingly the word ‘security’ and the word 
‘share’ will be used interchangeably in this chapter. 
5.1 Meaning and legal nature of a ‘share’ 
From the above, it is evident that any share (including an uncertificated share) will constitute a ‘security’ 
for STT purposes. The Companies Act, 2008 defines a ‘share’ as ‘one of the units into which the 
proprietary interest in a profit company is divided’.126 Likewise, the Income Tax Act defines a ‘share’ in 
a company as ‘any unit into which the proprietary interest in that company is divided’.127 While the term 
‘proprietary interest’ is not defined in either the Companies Act, 2008 or the Income Tax Act,  it is 
understood to mean any ‘[a]dvantage, profit, right, or share held by the owner of a tangible or intangible 
asset or property with all associated rights’.128 
Authorities agree that no simple definition of a share can be derived from the common law129 and that 
its ‘various definitions emphasise a complex of characteristics which are peculiar to it’.130 In the English 
case of Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd131 it was held in respect of the nature of a share 
that:  
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‘A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of 
money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but 
also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders 
inter se … The contract contained in the articles of association is one of the original 
incidents of the share. A share is not a sum of money settled … but is an interest 
measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights contained in the 
contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or less amount.’ 
In a South African context it was similarly held in Ocean Commodities (A) that a ‘share in a company 
consists of a bundle, or conglomerate, of personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a certain interest 
in the company, its assets and dividends’.132 The legal nature of a share was subsequently described 
in Cooper v Boyes as follows:133 
 ‘The gist … is that a share represents an interest in a company that consists of a 
complex of personal rights which may, as an incorporeal moveable entity, be 
negotiated or otherwise disposed of. It is certainly not a consumable article, such as 
money, even though a money value can be placed on it. Nor can it, by any analogy, 
be likened to a debt which may give rise to a claim of some kind or another, even 
though the debt and related claim may eventuate in an award of money being made 
to the claimant in respect of such debt. The fact that the value of a share in a 
company may fluctuate for a great variety of reasons, or that it may be affected by 
all manner of eventualities which may befall the company … cannot change its 
essential nature. It cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be converted from an 
interest or conglomerate of personal rights.’ 
In Letseng Diamonds Ltd v JCI Ltd; Trinity Management (Pty) Ltd v Investec Bank Ltd134  these personal 
rights were described as those rights that are fixed in the relevant company's documents of 
incorporation and which, in the normal course of events, afford the shareholder (i) the right to dividends 
when declared, (ii) the right to a return of capital on the winding-up of the company (or authorised 
reduction of capital) and (iii) the right to attend and vote at meetings of shareholders.135 
The legal nature of a share is further regulated by section 35 of the Companies Act, 2008, which 
specifically provides that a share issued by a company is movable property which is transferable in any 
manner provided for, or recognised, by the Companies Act, 2008 or other legislation.136 This 
classification as movable property is significant as, in the case of immovable property, a court cannot 
go behind the relevant register to determine the owner of the article. Accordingly, if a share was 
classified as immovable property, a court would have been bound by the company’s share register 
when determining the owner of that share. Based on the fact that a share is statutorily recognised to be 
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of a movable nature, ‘a Court can go behind the register to ascertain the identity of the true owner’ of a 
share.137 A share’s movable nature thus results in Courts, in determining ‘beneficial ownership’ of a 
share, being entitled to take into account parties with direct or indirect interests in a share beyond only 
those reflected in the company’s share register. 
In summary, a share is therefore an incorporeal movable representing a bundle of personal rights. 
These personal rights typically include the following rights of the shareholder:138 
 the right to dividends when declared;  
 the right to share in the ‘surplus assets’ of the company (if any), whether by way of an authorised 
return of capital or upon the winding-up of the company; and  
 the right to attend and vote at general meetings of shareholders. 
5.2 Distinction between a transfer of a ‘share’ and the rights comprising a ‘share’ 
Under the common law a distinction is drawn between:139 
 the transfer of the rights of which the share comprises, which can occur by way of cession 
and is not subject to any prescribed procedural corporate law requirements; and  
 the transfer of the share (that is to say, the incorporeal movable) itself, which is simply the 
formal process by which the new owner of a share is recognised as such by the company and 
third parties by way of compliance with the prescribed procedural corporate law requirements 
for the transfer of a share.  
In this regard, the authors of Henochsberg conclude that ‘apart from the transfer of the share itself, the 
shareholder can also transfer particular right/s (comprising the share) … which is not the transfer of the 
share itself.’140 This distinction appears to be rooted in the ‘disjuncture’ expressed by Borrowdale 
between ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share (i.e. the entitlement to the rights against the company) and 
the registered title to that share (i.e. the ability to exercise or enforce those rights against the 
company).141 Furthermore, it aligns with the view set out in 5.3 below that the process of legally 
transferring a share is not a single act, but consists of a series of steps, which includes the registration 
of the transfer in accordance with the Companies Act, 2008.142  
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This view was endorsed by the High Court in Tigon Limited v Bestyet Investments (Proprietary) 
Limited,143 where it was held that:144 
‘It seems … that a distinction (not always recognised) may be drawn between the 
share itself, which is an incorporeal moveable entity, and the bundle of personal 
rights to which it gives rise.’ 
The relevance of this view in the context of the STT Act is highlighted by the fact that any right or 
entitlement to receive any distribution from a company, which is one of the rights that a share comprises 
of, was specifically removed from the definition of ‘security’ for STT purposes with effect from 1 April 
2012.145 In the explanatory memorandum accompanying that amendment, it was stated that such 
dividend cessions would no longer be subject to STT based on the fact that a dividend cession is an 
income right that is ‘totally independent of the underlying shares’ and is ‘no longer viewed as part of the 
security’.146 This reinforces the view that the transfer of the personal rights making up a share (that is 
to say, (i) the right to dividends when declared, (ii) the right to share in the ‘surplus assets’ of the 
company and (iii) the right to attend and vote at general meetings) can be transferred separately from 
the underlying share by means of a mere cession that doesn’t necessarily constitute the transfer of a 
‘security’ for STT purposes. 
5.3 Requirements for the ‘transfer of a share’ 
In Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n ander v Booyens147 the Court emphasised that the 
basis for shareholding in a company is derived from legislation and held that the provisions of the 
Companies Act, 1973 should be the point of departure in determining whether the shares in a private 
company could be transferred.148 In Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers,149 the 
Court also held that: 
‘In regard to shares, the word 'transfer' in its full and technical sense, is not a 
single act but consists of a series of steps, namely an agreement to transfer, the 
execution of a deed of transfer and, finally, the registration of the transfer.’ 
According to Vermaas, the process of transferring a share (including the rights and obligations attaching 
to that share) is not limited to the aforementioned three steps in practice, though they are the most 
important ones.150 She further states that the entering into a purchase agreement in respect of a share 
will not, in itself, be sufficient to effect transfer of ownership of a share.151    
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Based on the above, the legal ‘transfer’ of a share (which will include the rights and obligations attaching 
to that share) will entail at least the following three events: 
 the entering into a sale and purchase agreement by the parties in terms whereof the share is 
ceded; 
 performance of the obligations in terms of that agreement; and 
 registration of the transfer so as to effect the change of membership in the company. 
In the context of the third event listed above, the effect of the Smuts judgment is that the ‘registration of 
the transfer so as to effect the change of membership in the company’ has to occur in accordance with 
any statutory requirements specified in the Companies Act, 2008 to result in a legal ‘transfer’ of the 
share ‘in its full and technical sense’. This view is supported by the following: 
 According to the preamble to the Companies Act, 2008, one of its purposes is ‘to define the 
relationships between companies and their respective shareholders or members and directors’; 
and 
 Part E of Chapter 2152 deals with what is termed ‘Securities registration and transfer’, and 
consists of provisions dealing with the registration and transfer of certificated shares, 
uncertificated shares and beneficial interests in shares. 
As set out in 5.2 above, there is a distinction between the transfer of a share and a transfer of the rights 
comprising the share. This distinction is illustrated by the fact that, under the common law, no formalities 
are required in that the rights pass by way of cession,153 while the transfer of legal ownership of a share 
requires the registration of the share in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Companies 
Act.154 In this regard, full title to the shares is conferred only by registration of transfer but, as between 
the transferor and transferee, ‘beneficial ownership’ passes under the ordinary principles of cession 
independently of and prior to registration.155 
In the context of uncertificated shares this distinction becomes less pronounced. This is the case, as 
the transfer of ‘ownership’ of an uncertificated share and the transfer of ‘rights associated with’ an 
uncertificated share are effectively subject to the same procedural requirement. In this regard: 
 the transfer of ‘ownership’ of an uncertificated share is subject to ‘debiting the account in the 
uncertificated securities register from which the transfer is effected and crediting the account in 
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Companies Act, 2008 requires, that every transfer must be entered into the company’s register. In respect of uncertificated shares, 
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the uncertificated securities register to which the transfer is effected’ in accordance with the 
rules of a CSD;156 and 
 the transfer of ‘rights associated with’ an uncertificated share occurs as ‘determined in 
accordance with the rules of the CSD’,157 with the relevant CSD rules providing that the transfer 
of ownership of rights associated with a security158 is also effected by the debiting of the 
Securities Account of the transferor and crediting the Securities Account of the transferee.159  
The practical effect thereof is that where legal ownership of the entire bundle of the rights comprising 
an uncertificated share is transferred simultaneously, registration in accordance with the Companies 
Act, 2008 will be required – and upon such registration occurring, transfer of the uncertificated share 
itself will effectively also occur. Therefore, even though the rights associated with an uncertificated 
share in themselves do not constitute an uncertificated share, a simultaneous acquisition of all of them 
in accordance with the requirements of the Companies Act, 2008 will effectively result in an acquisition 
of the uncertificated share itself.160 On the other hand, should the cession of the rights associated with 
the uncertificated share not be registered as required, the registered holder will still own the rights 
associated with the share but as the nominee for the new beneficial holder161 – and this will not 
constitute the transfer of the share itself. 
It follows that, in the absence of compliance with the procedural requirements in the Companies Act, 
2008, no legal ‘transfer’ in the ‘full and technical sense’ of a share will occur. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter considered the scope and meaning of the term ‘security’, as well as the requirements for 
effecting a ‘transfer of a share’, as a requirement for the imposition of STT.  
The legal ‘transfer’ of a share usually entails three events, the last of which is the registration of the 
transfer so as to effect the change of membership. As the basis for shareholding in a company is derived 
from corporate law legislation, the requirements prescribed by the Companies Act, 2008 must be 
satisfied to effect the legal transfer of a share. In the context of uncertificated shares, the Companies 
Act, 2008 provides that: 
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Securities by debiting the account in the Uncertificated Securities Register from which the transfer is effected and crediting the 
account in the Uncertificated Securities Register to which the transfer is effected in accordance with the Strate Rules, and in 
respect of Securities issued in terms of the Companies Act, in the manner provided for in Part E of Chapter 2 of that Act’. 
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Companies Act 71 of 2008, 174 – 175, where it is stated that the ‘acquisition of the rights associated with a share equals ownership 
of the share because the rights (or rather the competencies in respect of the rights) that comprise the share is “ownership” of the 
share’. 




 the transfer of uncertificated securities may be effected only in accordance with the rules of 
the relevant CSD;162 
 a person acquires the rights associated with an uncertificated share as determined in 
accordance with the rules of the CSD;163 and 
 a person can only acquire ownership of a security upon debiting the account in the 
uncertificated securities register from which the transfer is effected and crediting the account in 
the uncertificated securities register to which the transfer is effected in accordance with the 
rules of the relevant CSD.164  
On this basis, compliance with the procedures as set out in the relevant CSD rules is effectively elevated 
to a requirement for the legal transfer of ownership of an uncertificated share under the Companies Act, 
2008. 
While a share is defined as comprising of a bundle of personal rights, a distinction can be drawn 
between (i) the rights comprising that share and (ii) the share itself. Those rights will therefore not 
constitute a ‘security’ for STT purposes. In addition, the transfer of those rights occurs through cession 
without any procedural formalities. As no transfer in the full and technical sense can occur in the 
absence of compliance with the registration requirements in the Companies Act, 2008, a transfer of 
those rights will also not constitute the ‘transfer of a share’. Nevertheless, the transfer of all the rights 
comprising the share may effectively result in a transfer of the share itself to the extent that the 
transaction requires the same procedural requirements as the transfer of a share.  
It follows that, save for the situation described directly above, only a change in registered title holder of 
a share in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Companies Act, 2008 will result in a 
‘transfer’ of a ‘share’ for STT purposes.  
In light of the findings in this chapter and in the preceding four chapters, it now falls to consider the 
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CHAPTER 6: PRACTICAL DELINEATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF 
STT  
As set out in Chapter 1, STT will be imposed on the occurrence of any ‘transfer’ event of a ‘security’ 
that results in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ and transfer of that security, unless that ‘transfer’ event 
is the issue of a security or the cancellation or redemption of a security of a company that is being 
wound up, liquidated, deregistered or finally terminated. 
Based on the findings in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, STT will, practically, only be levied on a 
transaction concerning a share to the extent that: 
 there is a disposal or other alienation of that share (see Chapter 2); and 
 subsequent to the transaction, someone else’s right or entitlement to the benefits (such as the 
voting rights, the right to receive dividends or the right to share in the surplus assets upon 
liquidation of the company) attaching to that share outweighs the transferor’s, or any other 
person’s, right or entitlement to those benefits (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4); and 
 all the corporate law requirements (such as those prescribed by the Companies Act, 2008) for 
the transfer of title to that share has been met (see Chapter 5). 
In many instances, the disposal of the personal rights comprising a share will result in a change in 
‘beneficial ownership’ of that share (for example, where the rights comprising the share are ceded or 
where a conferral of a beneficial interest to third party occurs). As illustrated in 4.1 and 5.3 above, such 
a transfer of the personal rights comprising a share will not necessarily require the debiting and crediting 
of the transferor and transferee’s respective CSD accounts; and will therefore not constitute the 
‘transfer’ of the ‘share’ itself (unless the underlying share is debited and credited in the transferor and 
transferee’s respective CSD accounts). This is the case, as the transfer of a ‘share’ will only occur upon 
compliance with the relevant requirements contained in the Companies Act, 2008, (as opposed to the 
transfer of the rights comprising the share, which has no formal procedural requirements and can occur 
by means of a mere cession). Accordingly, instances may arise where a transaction results in a ‘change 
in beneficial ownership’, but does not constitute the ‘transfer of a share’ since the relevant procedural 
requirements contained in the Companies Act, 2008 have not been met. It follows that the main 
consideration in ascertaining whether a particular ‘transfer’ event results in the imposition of STT is not 
whether a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ has occurred, but rather whether the prescribed procedural 
requirements for the transfer of a share (currently the debiting and crediting of the transferor and 
transferee’s respective CSD accounts) were satisfied in order for the transaction to constitute the 
‘transfer of a security’. 









(Chapters 3 & 4) 




X sells a share and all the rights 
attaching thereto to Y and the 
share is registered in Y’s name in 
accordance with the CSD Rules 
    
X cedes all the rights attaching to 
a share to Y and transfer of the 
rights are registered in 
accordance with the Companies 
Act, 2008 
    
X cedes all the rights attaching to 
a share to Y and the beneficial 
interest is disclosed in terms of 
the Companies Act, 2008, but no 
registration occurs in terms of the 
Companies Act, 2008 
    
X grants a beneficial interest in 
the majority of the rights attaching 
to a share to Y and the beneficial 
interest is disclosed in terms of 
the Companies Act, 2008, but no 
registration occurs in terms of the 
Companies Act, 2008 
    
X grants a beneficial interest in 
the minority of the rights attaching 
to a share to Y, but no beneficial 
interest is disclosed and no 
registration occurs in terms of the 
Companies Act, 2008 






CHAPTER 7: STT CONSEQUENCES OF A REPURCHASE OF UNCERTIFICATED SHARES  
From a commercial perspective, one of the issues to be taken into account by a repurchasing company 
is the STT consequences of the transaction.165 However, notwithstanding the fact that share 
repurchases have become an increasingly popular tool to use as part of restructurings and acquisitions 
in South Africa due to their usefulness in achieving the various commercial objectives set out under 7.1 
below, uncertainty still exists around the tax treatment thereof. This uncertainty stems from the fact that, 
even though share repurchases are specifically recognised by the Companies Act, 2008166 and the 
Income Tax Act,167 no revenue legislation contains special provisions that comprehensively deal with 
the tax consequences of a share repurchase.  
This uncertainty is illustrated by Brincker, who states that particular tax treatments of a share 
repurchase could theoretically even result in STT being payable twice on a repurchase.168  This view is 
based on the fact that both a ‘sale’ (or any ‘disposal in any other manner’) and a ‘cancellation’ that does 
not occur as a result of the liquidation of the company will qualify as ‘transfer’ events that may give rise 
to STT. 
Chapter 7 will therefore examine and compare the treatment of a share repurchase from both a 
corporate law perspective and the SARS perspective, seeking to determine the STT consequences of 
each approach with reference to the STT requirements as discussed in the prior chapters and 
considering whether they result in different STT consequences. 
7.1 Relevance of share repurchases and historical development thereof in South Africa 
This sub-chapter will briefly set out the commercial relevance of share repurchases in both a global and 
domestic context. In addition, it will provide a brief overview of the historical development of share 
repurchases in South Africa, in order to provide background and context when considering and 
comparing the treatment of a share repurchase from a corporate law perspective and the SARS 
perspective in 7.2 below. 
In recent times, share repurchases have become common-place in global commerce.  This has been a 
direct result of the fact that they can readily be utilised as a way of unlocking the investment made by a 
shareholder who no longer wishes to be involved in the company, a means by which a company can 
rid itself of a dissident shareholder or a means to facilitate or implement share-based compensation 
schemes.169 In a South African context, share repurchases have also increasingly been utilised to 
achieve the following objectives:170  
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167 The definition of ‘dividend’ in section 1(1) of the Income Tax Act provides, inter alia, that ‘“dividend” means any amount 
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168 Brincker, UA – 7. 
169 Siddle, A.M., 2006. ‘Share Repurchases in South Africa: Reasons and Returns’. M.Com Dissertation, University of Cape 
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 the enhancement of a company's earnings per share; 
 the enhancement of a company's net assets per share; 
 creating, maximising or enhancing value for shareholders; 
 enabling or facilitating the exit of a disinvesting shareholder; and 
 facilitating the introduction of a BEE participant. 
A share repurchase may be defined as ‘a transaction entered into between a company and one or more 
of its shareholders in terms of which it is agreed that the company will take back their shares in return 
for an agreed consideration, to be paid by the company to the shareholders concerned’.171  
Under the Companies Act, 1973 there was initially a complete bar on share repurchases. In this regard, 
the Companies Act, 1973 provided that a company could neither hold, nor acquire, its own shares, even 
if permitted to do so by its Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association.172 This prohibition 
stemmed from the strict capital maintenance rules contained within the Companies Act, 1973 and 
served a twofold purpose:  
 it protected the company's creditors by preventing what would have amounted to an unlawful 
reduction of the company's capital. In this regard, our courts had held that persons who give 
credit to the company was entitled to rely upon the issued share capital of the debtor company 
for payment of their claims and that shareholders should therefore not be allowed to 
subsequently withdraw their capital investment;173 and 
 it protected the company's shareholders by preventing the company from ‘trafficking in its own 
shares’174.175 This was the case, as directors might have used a share buy-back to maintain 
themselves in control, to manipulate voting power or to buy out inconvenient shareholders.176  
In contrast, this rule against a company purchasing its own shares was rejected in most jurisdictions in 
the United States of America. In addition, by 1989 the strict capital maintenance rules had also been 
either relaxed or abolished in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.177 After 
identifying the commercial advantages that the ability to repurchase its own shares held for companies 
trading in those jurisdictions, South African corporate law took an about-turn in respect of the ability of 
                                                             
171 Blackman et al. 2017. Commentary on the Companies Act (electronic version). Juta, 5-43. 
172 Gondwe, R. D. 2015. ‘Incomplete Company Law Reform: The Treasury Shares Question in South Africa’. M.Com Dissertation, 
University of Cape Town, 1. 
173 Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W), 705-706. See also The Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T), 
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175 Commentary on the Companies Act, 5-23. 
176 Mtwebana, K. F. 2005. ‘Towards a More Flexible Structure of the Share Capital: A comparison of the company law of South 
Africa and Switzerland with regard to current debates and developments in the EU’. LLM Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 
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a company to acquire its own shares in 1999, with the promulgation into law of the Companies 
Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1999 (‘1999 amendment’). In this regard, the Memorandum on the Objects 
of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999, specifically stated that: 
 ‘[T]he principles of capital maintenance have undergone significant changes in 
almost all countries. The modern notion of capital maintenance is that companies 
may reduce capital, including the acquisition of their own shares, but subject to 
solvency and liquidity criteria. This has the advantage of affording protection to 
creditors whilst at the same time giving flexibility to companies to achieve sound 
commercial objectives. These aspects of flexibility and achievement of sound 
commercial objectives have become extremely important since South Africa’s re-
entry into the global markets.’ 
After implementation of the 1999 amendment, section 85 of the Companies Act, 1973 conferred the 
right to companies to acquire or purchase their own shares under certain circumstances.178 The 
introduction of these provisions signalled a new dawn for the capital maintenance rule in South Africa 
as it, for the first time, allowed companies to acquire their own shares.179 
In 2011, the Companies Act, 2008 introduced an overhaul of what was considered a largely out-dated 
company law regime. As part of this process, the specific recognition of share repurchases in the 
Companies Act, 1973 was retained.180 Apart from specifically allowing a company to repurchase its own 
shares, the Companies Act, 2008 also provides for a subsidiary to hold so-called treasury shares in its 
holding company.181  
7.2 Mechanics of a share repurchase  
As set out in 5.3 above, the basis for shareholding in a company is derived from the provisions of the 
Companies Act, 2008. Therefore, in the absence of tax legislation providing for a particular treatment 
of a share repurchase for tax purposes, the general provisions of the tax Acts must be applied with due 
regard to (i) the legal mechanics of a share repurchase and (ii) the extent to which it results in the 
transfer of the rights pertaining to a share.  
In 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 below, the treatment of a share repurchase is considered from a corporate law and 
SARS perspective respectively. As highlighted earlier in Chapter 7, the difference in these approaches 
could potentially result in differing STT consequences.182 
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180 Ibid. 
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7.2.1 Corporate Law Position 
Companies Act, 1973 
As set out earlier, the Companies Act, 1973 was amended in 1999 to permit the repurchase by a 
company of its own shares. The amended section 85 of the Companies Act, 1973 allowed the 
repurchase by a company of its own shares, provided the company’s Articles of Association authorised 
repurchases and that approval was obtained by way of special resolution.183 In this regard, section 85(1) 
provided that a company could approve the acquisition of its own shares, while section 85(8) specifically 
provided that repurchased shares ‘shall be cancelled as issued shares and restored to the status of 
authorised shares forthwith.’ 
This raised the question as to whether the repurchased shares can be said to have been 'acquired' by 
the repurchasing company at any stage. In this regard, Blackman stated that, strictly speaking, the 
company does not 'purchase' or 'buy' its shares, as a company cannot acquire rights against itself; and 
since the rights against the company are extinguished, the company does not purchase anything.184 
Likewise, Cassim stated that a company cannot have ‘ownership’ or a proprietary interest in itself, or 
legal rights and powers derived from itself.185 
Blackman illustrated the point as follows:186 
‘[A] share is a bundle of rights. Where a company buys its own shares, one of these 
rights will be a right of action against itself. Obviously, the company cannot be the 
owner of a claim against itself. . . . How can one acquire a right against oneself? To 
state the proposition is to demonstrate the absurdity.’ 
According to Henochsberg, the rights comprising a share only come into existence if it is capable of 
being exercised against the company.187 As a company cannot sue itself for performance,188 a share 
will cease to exist immediately when it is repurchased, because the conglomerate of rights comprising 
that share will not be capable of being exercised against the company at that stage. Section 85 therefore 
ensured that a company was unable to trade in its own shares by insisting that repurchased shares 
were cancelled as issued shares.189 
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Accordingly, under the Companies Act, 1973, where a share was repurchased by a company from one 
of its shareholders: 
 the repurchasing company never became the owner of, or entitled to exercise, the rights 
comprising that shares; and 
 the repurchased share was never transferred to that repurchasing company, but cancelled by 
virtue of the repurchase transaction.  
Stated differently, a company repurchasing its own shares never acquired the share itself, but rather an 
authorised, but unissued, version of that share. 
Companies Act, 2008 
The Companies Act, 2008 specifically recognises a repurchase by a company of its own shares and, 
similar to section 85 of the Companies Act, 1973, section 48 of the Companies Act, 2008 provides that 
a company can ‘acquire’ its own shares.  In this regard, section 35 provides that a repurchased share 
will ‘have the same status as shares that have been authorised but not issued’.190 As only issued shares 
have rights associated with it,191 a share should automatically cease to exist immediately when it is 
repurchased. The question that arises is whether the provisions in the Companies Act, 2008 dealing 
with a share repurchase constituted a departure from the approach under the Companies Act, 1973, (in 
terms whereof a repurchased share was never transferred to the repurchasing company and that 
repurchasing company never became the owner of, or entitled to exercise, the rights comprising that 
share). 
In this regard, both section 85(8) of the Companies Act, 1973 and section 35(5) of the Companies Act, 
2008 refers to shares being ‘acquired’ by the repurchasing company, while only section 85(5) of the 
Companies Act, 1973 refers to the shares having to be ‘cancelled’. However, commentators are 
generally in agreement that the mechanics of a share repurchase under the Companies Act, 2008 does 
not differ from a share repurchase under the Companies Act, 1973. In particular, the view is held that a 
company remains unable to ‘acquire’ and hold its own shares, as a company cannot hold or exercise 
rights against itself;192 and that the reference to ‘acquire’ in the context of a share repurchase is 
therefore a ‘misnomer’.193 In this regard, Henochsberg states that, although the ordinary legal meaning 
of the word ‘acquire’ means ‘obtaining the ownership of’, a company cannot own shares in itself.194 The 
term ‘acquisition’ should therefore simply be understood to include any instance where a shareholder 
relinquishes rights in respect of a share to the company.195 
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7.2.2 SARS Position 
Companies Act, 1973 
The view that a company was unable to ‘acquire’ and hold its own shares under the Companies Act, 
1973, used to be expressly supported by SARS. In its Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Bill, 1999 that dealt with the tax related amendments necessitated by the 1999 amendment 
to the Companies Act, 1973, it was specifically stated that: 
‘In terms of these new provisions a company will be able to buy back its own shares 
which was not allowed under the previous provisions of that Act. The company 
acquiring its own shares, will, however, not transfer such shares into its own name, 
but the shares so acquired must be cancelled as issued shares and restored to the 
status of authorised shares.’ 
(Own underlining) 
Companies Act, 2008 
However, in contrast to its view under the Companies Act, 1973, SARS is of the view that, under the 
Companies Act, 2008, a repurchasing company acquires the repurchased share from its shareholder, 
and immediately thereafter the company cancels that share. In this regard, SARS states in the SARS 
CGT Guide196:197  
‘When a company buys back its own shares it acquires an asset which is held for 
an instant before being disposed of through cancellation or extinction … On the 
question of cancellation or extinction of a share so bought back, under section 35(5) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 shares of a company that have been issued and 
subsequently acquired by that company have the same status as shares that have 
been authorised but not issued. Under s 35(4) of the same Act an authorised share 
of a company has no rights associated with it until it has been issued. It follows that 
when a company acquires its own shares any rights in those shares are immediately 
extinguished by merger or confusio.’ 
Curiously, the SARS CGT Guide specifically acknowledges that ‘under South African law a company 
cannot hold rights against itself’, yet it maintains that ‘a company that buys back its own shares (which 
comprise a bundle of rights) immediately disposes of them by merger’.198 While the basis for the 
statement is unclear, SARS’ view appears to be that a repurchasing company acquires its issued shares 
for a moment in time, to be cancelled immediately upon re-acquisition through ‘merger or confusio’, 
which restores it to the status of authorised but unissued shares. This is based on SARS’ view that 
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there is a difference in the wording between the Companies Act, 2008 and Companies Act, 1973 in 
relation to share repurchases.199  In this regard, Seligson states the following: 
‘The new Companies Act retains provisions authorising share buy-backs, but in a 
substantially different form … As the following analysis of the requirements imposed 
in section 46 is intended to show, the buy-back provisions of the new Act in its original 
form differ in material respects from those applicable under the current Act.’200  
He proceeds to state that there ‘are a number of departures in the new Act from the buy-back provisions 
of the current statute that are noteworthy and call for comment’. 201  
SARS’ current view therefore appears to be that a share repurchase consists of two distinct ‘transfer’ 
events, namely a sale by the shareholder and a cancellation by the repurchasing company. 
7.3 Comparison between share redemption and share repurchase 
The nature of a redemption of redeemable shares from a tax perspective was considered in ITC 1859,202 
where it was held that ‘the redemption of shares results in the extinction and not in a transfer of the 
rights embodied in the shares to the company redeeming them, or to any other person’.203 The Court 
therefore found that a ‘redemption’ of a preference share does not involve a disposal of the preference 
share for CGT purposes by the preference shareholder ‘to’ the redeeming company. By extension, a 
redeeming company does not ‘acquire’ its own preference shares in the process of redeeming the 
shares - and the process will only involve a single disposal event. 
An interesting issue that arises is to what extent a share repurchase and a redemption of preference 
shares can be said to be similar, or even identical, in nature. Should they be similar in nature, the 
authority of ITC 1859 could lend support to the Corporate Law Position that a share repurchase consists 
of only a disposal of the repurchased share by the shareholder and no commensurate acquisition of the 
repurchased share by the repurchasing company; and thus only a single ‘transfer’ event for STT 
purposes.  
In order to establish whether it would be appropriate to apply the decision in ITC 1859 to a share 
repurchase, it must be determined to what extent a redemption and a share repurchase are similar in 
nature. Before one can consider whether there is a distinction between a share repurchase and 
redemption from a tax perspective (see 7.3.2. below), it should first be ascertained whether there is a 
distinction from a legal perspective (see 7.3.1 below).  
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7.3.1 Is there a distinction between a share repurchase and redemption from a legal perspective? 
According to Blackman, redeemable preference shares usually have more in common with long-term 
debt than equity and their redemption is therefore qualitatively different from a repurchase of ordinary 
shares.204 He is therefore of the view that there is a legal distinction between 'redemptions' and 
'repurchases' of shares, even though ‘both the terms refer to the taking back by a company of shares 
issued by it and, in return, the payment by the company of money or assets to the shareholder or 
shareholders concerned’.205 He distinguishes a ‘redemption’ from a share repurchase as follows:206 
‘The distinction between redemptions and repurchases (or buy-backs) thus turns on 
whether the company takes back its shares in accordance with rights attaching to 
the shares themselves (redemptions), or in accordance with a separate contract 
entered into between it and the shareholders concerned (repurchases or buy-
backs).’ 
This view was supported under the Companies Act, 1973 by the fact that it contained separate 
provisions governing share repurchases and the redemption of redeemable preference shares.207  
While the Companies Act, 2008 does not contain provisions that specifically govern redeemable shares, 
but rather various provisions that refer to redeemable shares and securities,208 the provisions dealing 
with share repurchases specifically does not apply to the 'redemption by the company of any 
redeemable securities in accordance with the terms and conditions of those securities'.209 
Accordingly, it appears that the distinction that was recognised under the Companies Act, 1973 was 
retained under the Companies Act, 2008.210 Nevertheless, it seems that the function of the distinction 
is simply to determine whether a transaction must be authorised in terms of the procedural requirements 
of section 46 or section 48 of the Companies Act, 2008. Accordingly, this distinction arguably does not 
extend to the actual legal mechanics of the transactions. 
7.3.2 Is there a distinction between a share repurchase and redemption from a tax perspective? 
As highlighted in 7.3 above, it was held in ITC 1859 that, similar to the Corporate Law Position in respect 
of a share repurchase set out in 7.2.1 above, a ‘redemption’ of a preference share does not involve a 
disposal of the preference share from the preference shareholder ‘to’ the redeeming company for tax 
purposes. However, the Court specifically declined to make a finding on whether a redemption and a 
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repurchase where similar in nature,211 notwithstanding the fact that SARS argued that a redemption 
was ‘a kind of buy-back’. 212 
SARS appears to have accepted the views expressed in ITC 1859, as it did not appeal the judgment 
and specifically refers thereto in the SARS CGT Guide.213 However, SARS makes it clear that, in its 
view, the judgment only applies to the redemption of preference shares and cautions taxpayers against 
seeking to extend the application of the principles enunciated in ITC 1859 to share repurchases.214  
According to SARS, even if a share repurchase and a redemption of preference shares were similar in 
nature, the principles will in any event no longer apply, since:215 
 ITC 1859 was decided under the Companies Act, 1973 and, in SARS’ view, there is a difference 
in the wording between the Companies Act, 2008 and Companies Act 1973 in relation to share 
repurchases; and 
 paragraph 11(2)(b) of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act would be rendered pointless if a 
company did not acquire its own shares in terms of a share repurchase. 
However, as set out in 7.2.1 above, commentators are generally in agreement that the mechanics of a 
share repurchase under the Companies Act, 2008 does not differ from one under the Companies Act, 
1973.216 Furthermore, paragraph 11(2)(b) simply disregards the event of the shares being cancelled as 
a disposal and does not provide that is a non-disposal for the company. It bears to be noted that 
paragraph 11(2)(b) formed part of the 8th Schedule since the inception of CGT on 1 October 2001, at 
which stage the Companies Act, 1973 was in force. In terms of the Companies Act, 1973, a company 
was entitled to convert its stated share capital from no par value into share capital consisting of par 
value shares and simultaneously cancel any excess share capital that was not taken up as part of the 
conversion by means of a special resolution.217 Accordingly, the reference to the cancellation of shares 
in paragraph 11(2)(b) does not exclusively cater for the cancellation of shares as a result of a 
repurchase, but also used to cater for the cancellation of excess share capital under section 75(4)(b) of 
the Companies Act, 1973. 
7.3.3 Concluding remarks 
Based on (i) the fact that the distinction between share redemptions and share repurchases arguably 
does not extend to their legal mechanics and (ii) SARS’ unpersuasive reasoning above, ITC 1859 could 
well apply in the context of a share repurchase. However, in light of the findings in 7.6 below, it is 
unnecessary to finally conclude on the matter from an STT perspective. 
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7.4 Practical treatment of share repurchases under the Companies Act, 2008 
The Companies Act, 2008 provides that a shareholder will only cease to have the rights associated with 
a share (i) in the case of certificated shares, when the re-acquisition is entered into the company’s 
register,218 or, in the case of uncertificated shares, as determined ‘in accordance with’ the rules of the 
CSD.219 Thus, a shareholder will only cease to be the owner of a repurchased share once the re-
acquisition is entered into the company’s register, or the requirements of the relevant CSD has been 
complied with.  
As set out in 5.3 above, the Strate Rules provide that the ‘transfer of ownership’ in any securities in a 
Securities Account must be effected by debiting of the Securities Account or Segregated Depository 
Account from which the transfer is effected and crediting the Securities Account or Segregated 
Depository Account to which the transfer is effected, as the case may be, in accordance with the 
Financial Markets Act, 2012,220 Companies Act, 2008, Strate Rules and Strate Directives.221 However, 
the Strate Rules do not specifically cater for a share repurchase. The Strate system operates on a 
‘debit-for-a-credit system’ and therefore a valid trade cannot be registered if there is no disposal entry 
and commensurate acquisition entry. Practically, to deal with this system functionality, participants 
report and submit repurchases to Strate in the form of transfers (that is to say, in the form of instructions 
to debit the shareholder’s account and credit the repurchasing company’s account). This creates the 
impression that the CSD rules require share repurchases to be treated in the way envisaged by SARS.  
However, it is submitted that the reference to the rules of the CSD in section 37(9) of the Companies 
Act, 2008 does not intend to elevate the procedural rules of CSD’s themselves to substantive legislation, 
or at least not law affecting the legal nature of transactions.222 This is based on the fact that: 
 Strate simply acts on instructions from participants and is not privy to the underlying causa of 
the transactions that are being registered. Strate’s treatment of a transaction should therefore 
not be an appropriate measure of the nature of the transaction that is registered; 
 the purpose of the reference to the CSD Rules in the provisions of the Companies Act, 2008 is 
simply to allow the CSD to determine the specific holding and transfer model for uncertificated 
shares, as this allows for flexibility to ensure that the procedural requirements adapt to the 
practical realities of global and domestic business developments financial markets;223 
 each CSD can determine their own rules, depending on their particular system functionalities. 
While Strate currently does not have specific rules for effecting a repurchase, another CSD may 
well have. If CSD’s rules in general are elevated to law, it would result in an untenable situation 
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where the legal mechanics of share repurchases are treated differently, depending on which 
CSD processes the trade; 
 section 37(9) of the Companies Act, 2008 only requires that registration or cessation of the 
rights attaching to the share must occur ‘in accordance with’ a CSD’s rules. Accordingly, it only 
requires compliance with those procedural rules (whatever they may be), rather than elevating 
them to law that affects the nature of a transaction. Therefore, where a CSD’s rules require a 
procedure to comply with the relevant CSD’s systems functionality, it does not affect the legal 
nature of the transaction or change the common law principle that a company cannot exercise 
rights against itself. 
Nevertheless, compliance with the procedural rules of CSD’s regulating the transfer of uncertificated 
shares is now a statutory requirement to prove ownership of an uncertificated share, or legal transfer 
thereof.224 The effect thereof is that the CSD register at any given moment reflects the owner of the 
uncertificated share and the rights attaching thereto. The purpose of the reference to the CSD rules is 
therefore simply a way to ensure that any procedural requirements for the registration of a trade that 
are prescribed by a particular CSD have to be followed in order to become the legal owner of an 
uncertificated share. However, whatever those procedures are, they should not affect the legal nature 
of the underlying transaction that is processed by the relevant CSD. 
7.5 Application of STT requirements in the context of a share repurchase of uncertificated 
shares 
As set out above, uncertainty exists around the mechanics of a share repurchase. On the one hand, 
the Corporate Law Position, which aligns with the judgment in ITC 1859 in the context of a share 
redemption, dictates that a company repurchasing its own shares never acquires the share itself and 
therefore involves only a single ‘transfer’ event. On the other hand, the SARS Position is that a share 
repurchase consists of two distinct ‘transfer’ events, namely a sale by the shareholder and a 
cancellation by the repurchasing company. 
It is preferable that share repurchases be treated in a uniform manner for corporate law and tax law 
purposes. More specifically, it is preferable that transactions are at least treated in a consistent manner 
for tax purposes (for instance in determining both the CGT and STT consequences of a transaction). 
Nevertheless, and irrespective of which approach correctly reflects the mechanics of a share 
repurchase, it is generally agreed that STT should be levied on a share repurchase only once.225 
However, this result should be based on, and supported by, a proper application of the provisions of 
the STT Act to a share repurchase. 
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As illustrated in Chapter 1, there are essentially three requirements that have to be met before STT will 
be imposed on a transaction: 
 There must be a ‘transfer’ event in relation to a ‘security’ (see Chapter 2); 
 The ‘transfer’ event must result in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in that security (see 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4); and  
 The ‘transfer’ event must relate to a ‘security’ and result in a ‘transfer of the security’ (see 
Chapter 5). 
The application of these requirements in the context of a share repurchase in terms of both the SARS 
Position and the Corporate Law Position is illustrated below.  
7.5.1 SARS Position (Two ‘transfer’ events) 
 
‘Transfer’ Event 1: Disposal by shareholder to repurchasing company 
‘Transfer’ event   
The repurchase by the company from its shareholder will constitute a 
‘sale’, or at least a ‘disposal in any other manner’. 
Transfer of a ‘share’  
A person ceases to have the rights associated with any particular securities 
as determined in accordance with the CSD Rules.226 As the share will be 
registered in the company’s name, as required by the CSD Rules, the 
disposal by the shareholder will constitute the transfer of a ‘share’. 
‘Change in beneficial ownership’  
As the company will, for an instant, acquire all the rights attaching to the 
repurchased share and therefore momentarily become the beneficial owner 
of the repurchased share, the disposal will result in a change in beneficial 
ownership.  
  
                                                             




‘Transfer’ Event 2: Cancellation by the repurchasing company 
‘Transfer’ event  
The cancellation of the repurchased share by the repurchasing company 
will constitute a ‘cancellation’ other in the process of winding-up, 
liquidation, deregistration or termination of the company’s corporate 
existence. 
Transfer of a ‘share’  
As the share will not be registered in the company’s name, the cancellation 
arguably not constitute the transfer of a ‘share’. 
‘Change in beneficial ownership’  
As the company will cease to be entitled to the benefits attaching to the 
repurchased share upon cancellation, the disposal will result in a change in 
beneficial ownership. 
 
Based on the above application of the definition of ‘transfer’, STT will only be levied on the disposal of 
the repurchased share by the shareholder to the company and not on the cancellation of the share by 
the repurchasing company. While this results in the desired outcome of a single levy of STT on the 
share repurchase, the following difficulties arise: 
 it renders the inclusion of the cancellation of a share other than in the process of winding-up, 
liquidation, deregistration or termination of the company’s corporate existence in the definition 
of ‘transfer’ pointless, as that ‘transfer’ event does not result in STT; and  
 it does not accord with the view of legal commentators and arguably the court in ITC 1859 as 
far as the mechanics of a share repurchase are concerned and infringes the principle that a 
company cannot own or exercise rights against itself, even momentarily.  
Admittedly, in the absence of the repurchased share being registered in the company’s own name 
pursuant to the CSD Rules, no ‘transfer of a share’ will occur. However, as set out above, the CSD 
Rules are purely procedural requirements that are subject to change and which may differ from 
exchange to exchange. The relevant CSD Rules should therefore not affect the legal nature of a 





7.5.2 Corporate Law Position (Single ‘transfer’ event) 
 
‘Transfer’ Event: Cancellation of share as a result of disposal by shareholder  
‘Transfer’ event  
The disposal of the repurchased share by the shareholder will constitute 
either a ‘sale’, ‘cancellation’ or at least a ‘disposal in any other manner’. 
Transfer of a ‘share’  
A person ceases to have the rights associated with any particular securities 
as determined in accordance with the CSD Rules.227 As the share will be 
registered in the company’s name, as required by the CSD Rules, the 
disposal by the shareholder will constitute the transfer of a ‘share’. The 
repurchase will constitute the transfer of a share, as the share will be 
registered in the repurchasing company’s CSD account.  
‘Change in beneficial ownership’  
The repurchase will result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in the 
repurchased share, as the shareholder will no longer be the beneficial 
owner of the repurchased share subsequent to the repurchase 
 
Based on the above application of the definition of ‘transfer’, the Corporate Law Position will also result 
in the desired outcome of a single levy of STT on a share repurchase. While this approach aligns with 
the legal mechanics of a share repurchase as well as that of a share redemption, it results in the 
following difficulties: 
 in terms the CSD Rules, the repurchased share still needs to be registered in the repurchasing 
company’s name. On the one hand, the procedural requirement in the CSD Rules must be 
complied with in order for the transfer to constitute the transfer of a ‘share’ (and be subject to 
STT). However, on the other hand, compliance with the procedural requirement results in the 
repurchasing company becoming the registered owner of its own share and creates a strong 
impression that the repurchasing company still acquires the repurchased share momentarily. 
This is however primarily the result of the CSD Rules not specifically catering for share 
                                                             




repurchases and the procedure by default reverting to the requirements for a sale of a share. 
In this regard it must be borne in mind that, as set out above, the CSD Rules are purely 
procedural requirements and should not affect the legal nature of a transaction; and 
 it will result in the untenable situation where SARS (correctly or incorrectly) treats a share 
repurchase differently for CGT and STT purposes. 
7.6 Conclusion 
There are currently two differing views in respect of the mechanics of a repurchase. In terms of the 
Corporate Law Position, a company repurchasing its own shares never acquires the share itself and 
thus involves only a single ‘transfer’ event. On the other hand, the SARS position is that a share 
repurchase consists of two distinct ‘transfer’ events, namely a sale by the shareholder and a 
cancellation by the repurchasing company. 
In ITC 1859, the Tax Court specifically found that a share redemption must be treated consistent with 
the Corporate Law Position for tax purposes. Therefore, to the extent that a share redemption and a 
share repurchase are similar in nature, a share repurchase should be treated in accordance with the 
Corporate Law Position. While there is a technical distinction between a share repurchase and share 
redemption for company law purposes, their mechanics are arguably similar in nature since a share 
redemption is effectively a specific type of repurchase. 
Nevertheless, both the Corporate Law Position and SARS Position result in a single STT charge on a 
share repurchase and the divergence in views is therefore arguably not critical in the context of STT. 
However, as set out under 7.5.1 and 7.5.2, both interpretations give rise to some practical anomalies 
and difficulties. In addition, it would be preferable, for the sake of legal certainty, if the tax treatment of 
a transaction aligned with the legal nature of that transaction.  
It is therefore recommended that the mechanics of a share repurchase be clarified through legislative 
amendments to the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act, the STT Act and the Companies Act, 2008. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that CSD Rules be reconsidered so as to provide for a separate 
procedure for the registration of a share repurchase, with due regard to the legal nature thereof. 
Alternatively, the provisions of the Companies Act should clarify the legal mechanics of a share 
repurchase and confirm that the CSD Rules are purely procedural and has no bearing on the legal 





CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
STT will be imposed on every occurrence of any ‘transfer’ event of a ‘security’ that results in a change 
in ‘beneficial ownership’ in that ‘security’, unless that ‘transfer’ event constitutes the issue of a security 
or the cancellation or redemption of a security of a company that is being wound up, liquidated, 
deregistered or finally terminated.  
Based on the charging provision in the STT Act read with the definition of ‘transfer’ in the STT Act, there 
are essentially three requirements that have to be satisfied before STT will be imposed on a transaction: 
 there must be a ‘transfer’ event in relation to a security; 
 the ‘transfer’ event must result in a change in ‘beneficial ownership’ in that security; and  
 the ‘transfer’ event must relate to a ‘security’ and constitute the transfer of that security. 
However, the concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ is not defined in the STT Act. Likewise, the intended 
scope, meaning and application of the concepts of a ‘transfer’, ‘security’ and ‘beneficial ownership’ for 
STT purposes aren’t always clear, resulting in practical difficulties. Accordingly, this dissertation 
primarily sought to identify, investigate and clarify the practical scope and meaning of the requirements 
for the imposition of STT. In addition, the dissertation seeks to apply these findings to a transaction that 
occur on a regular basis and serve important commercial purposes, being a share repurchase. 
The first requirement that must be satisfied for the imposition of STT is that a ‘transfer’ event in relation 
to a security must occur. The definition of ‘transfer’ for STT purposes is cast extremely wide and any 
form of disposal or alienation of a ‘security’ by the holder thereof will constitute a ‘transfer’ event that 
can potentially result in the imposition of STT. However, such a disposal or alienation will only result in 
STT if the second and third requirements below are also met. 
The second requirement that must be satisfied for the imposition of STT is that the ‘transfer’ event must 
result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in the security that the ’transfer’ event relates to. South 
African common law has long recognised a distinction between the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share and 
the registered owner thereof. The registered owner is the person who appears in the share register of 
the company, is a member of the company and can enforce its rights as member against the company. 
The so-called ‘beneficial owner’, on the other hand, does not appear in the share register, but is entitled 
to benefits flowing from the share. This distinction has recently also been acknowledged in the context 
of the Income Tax Act, particularly in the context of dividends tax and in determining whether a 
‘connected person’ relationship exists between taxpayers.  
The term ‘beneficial ownership’ is however not defined in the STT Act and has not been authoritatively 
interpreted by a South African court. In this regard, the Constitution requires South African courts to 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation (such as the STT Act) that is consistent with 




will, at least, have persuasive value in South African courts. As indicated in Part A of Chapter 3, there 
is currently no universally accepted definition of the term ‘beneficial ownership’. Nevertheless, based 
on the relevant international case law, it will be appropriate for a South African court tasked with 
establishing the domestic meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’, as a point of departure, to consider whether 
the entity claiming ‘beneficial ownership’ of the share is a ‘mere conduit’ or whether it (i) receives the 
income from the shares for its own enjoyment, (ii) assumes the risk and control of the shares and (iii) is 
not wholly accountable to anyone else for how the shares are dealt with. 
In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘beneficial ownership’ for STT purposes and regard being had 
for (i) the ordinary grammatical meaning of the term ‘beneficial ownership’, (ii) the context of the overall 
scheme of the STT Act, (iii) the purpose of the provision against the background to the production of 
the STT Act and (vi) appropriate international case law, the term ‘beneficial ownership’ should include 
any person who has a right or entitlement to the benefits attaching to that share, unless that person is 
an intermediary or ‘conduit’ with absolutely no discretion with regards to the benefits of the share. On 
that basis, Chapter 3 concludes that the ‘beneficial owner’ of a share will be the person whose right or 
entitlement to the benefits attaching to that share outweighs those of any other person.  
Therefore, in order for a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ to occur, a ‘transfer’ event relating to a share 
must result in either (i) a different person being entitled to the majority of the benefits attaching to that 
share or, at least (ii) in the transferor no longer being entitled to the majority of the benefits attaching to 
that share. Practically, there are no prescribed procedural requirements (such as registration in 
accordance with the Companies Act, 2008) that must satisfied in order for a ‘change in beneficial 
ownership’ to occur. Furthermore, it is concluded that a ‘beneficial interest’ as envisaged in the 
Companies Act, 2008 does not necessarily equate to ‘beneficial ownership’ of a share, since there can 
be more than one ‘beneficial interest holder’ of a share, but only a single ‘beneficial owner’ of a share. 
Nevertheless, these concepts are not mutually exclusive, since the granting of a beneficial interest in a 
share that amounts to a right or entitlement to the majority of the benefits attaching to that share, will 
result in a ‘change in beneficial ownership’ in that share. 
The third requirement that must be satisfied for the imposition of STT is that the ‘transfer’ event must 
relate to a ‘security’ and constitute the ‘transfer of a security’. The definition of ‘security’ in the STT Act 
includes the ordinary notion of a share in a company. As set out in Chapter 5, a share is an incorporeal 
movable consisting of a bundle of personal rights. This bundle of rights comprise of, inter alia, (i) the 
right to dividends when declared, (ii) the right to share in the ‘surplus assets’ of the company (if any) 
whether by way of an authorised return of capital or upon the winding-up of the company and (iii) the 
right to attend and vote at general meetings of shareholders. These rights are capable of being 
transferred (either individually or collectively) independently from the share itself. Accordingly, a share 
exists apart from the rights that it comprises. This notion is supported by the fact that South African 
courts have consistently recognised that ownership of shares is at times distinct from the registered title 
to shares. The state of affairs in this regard is best illustrated by Borrowdale’s ‘unsatisfactory position’, 




the ‘beneficial owner’ thereof. These obligations involve (i) the rights comprising the share which the 
registered title holder possesses as against the company by virtue of his registration and which he alone 
can enforce and (ii) the rights of entitlement to the benefits of the rights comprising the share of the 
‘beneficial owner’ against the registered title holder created by the agreement between them. 
It is on this basis that the common law distinguishes between: 
 the transfer of particular rights comprising the share, which usually equates to the transfer of 
‘beneficial ownership, or least of a ‘beneficial interest’; and  
 the transfer of title of the share, which equates to a transfer of the share itself.  
Practically, the transfer of rights comprising a share can be effected by means of a cession without 
compliance with any formal procedural requirements. However, in order to effect the transfer of 
registered title of a share, the procedural requirements prescribed in the Companies Act, 2008, must 
be complied with. Accordingly, Chapter 5 concludes that no ‘transfer’ of a ‘share’ can occur for STT 
purposes in the absence of all the corporate law requirements for the transfer of title to that share having 
been met. 
Chapter 6 concludes that the practical requirement for the imposition of STT on the transfer of a share 
will, based on the above findings, effectively amount to the following: 
 there must be any kind of disposal or other alienation of that share;  
 subsequent to the transaction, someone else’s right or entitlement to the benefits (such as the 
voting right, the right to receive dividends or the right to share in the surplus assets upon 
liquidation of the company) attaching to that share must outweigh the transferor’s, or any other 
person’s, right or entitlement to those benefits; and 
 all the prescribed procedural requirements (such as the procedural requirements relating to 
registration prescribed in the Companies Act, 2008) for the transfer of that share must be met. 
Chapter 7 seeks to apply the STT requirements considered in the preceding chapters to a common 
commercial transaction; a share repurchase. The fact that the legal mechanics of a share repurchase 
has not been authoritatively settled, results in potential uncertainties regarding the STT treatment of a 
share repurchase. Commentators are generally in agreement that, from a legal perspective, the 
reference to ‘acquire’ in the context of a share repurchase is a ‘misnomer’, as a company is unable to 
‘acquire’ and hold its own shares.  Accordingly, from a corporate law perspective, a share repurchase 
involves only a single ‘transfer’ event for STT purposes. On the other hand, and in contrast to its initial 
view under the Companies Act, 1973, SARS is of the view that a share repurchase consists of two 
distinct ‘transfer’ events, namely an acquisition by the repurchasing company of the repurchased share 
from its shareholder for a moment in time and a subsequent cancellation of that repurchased share by 




In addition, SARS distinguishes a share repurchase from share redemption (the mechanics of which 
has been settled from a tax perspective). This distinction further aggravates the uncertainty with regards 
to the STT treatment of a share repurchase, as it prevents the tax principles that apply in respect of a 
share redemption from being applied in the context of a share repurchase. However, based on the 
finding below, it is unnecessary to definitively conclude on the similarities between a share repurchase 
and redemption from a tax perspective. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 highlights that there is potentially no 
difference in the legal mechanics of a share repurchase and redemption, since the distinction between 
the transactions in terms of the Companies Act, 2008 appear to be purely formalistic in nature. 
Chapter 7 primarily concludes that, notwithstanding the inconsistency between the corporate law 
position and the SARS position in respect of the mechanics and treatment of a share repurchase, the 
requirements for the imposition of STT can be interpreted in such a way that both views result in a 
single STT charge on a share repurchase. However, both interpretations result in varying degrees of 
practical anomalies and difficulties. Due to these anomalies, as well as SARS’ unpersuasive reasons 
for (i) its departure from its previous view in respect of the mechanics of a share repurchase and (ii) 
distinguishing between a share repurchase and a share redemption, Chapter 7 recommends that the 
mechanics and treatment of a share repurchase should be clarified through definitive guidance or 
legislative amendments. These can include one or more of the following measures: 
 amendments to the STT Act that clarify the STT consequences of a share repurchase; 
 amendments to the Companies Act, 2008 that clarify the legal mechanics of a share 
repurchase;  
 amendments to the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act that clarify the CGT consequences of  
a share repurchase; 
 amendments to the CSD Rules so as to provide for a separate procedural treatment of a share 
repurchase that takes its legal nature into account;  
 An Interpretation Note that clarifies all the tax consequences of a share repurchase, with 
specific reference to the basis for any departure from the tax consequences of a share 
redemption. 
Any combination of the aforementioned measures will provide more certainty on the STT analysis of a 






ANNEXURE A: INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW SUMMARIES 
This annexure sets out a more detailed summary of the background facts, arguments presented and 
findings made in the international case law referred to in Part A of Chapter 3. It is therefore 
recommended that the comments and conclusions in Part A of Chapter 3 be considered in the context 
of the more detailed case summaries below. 
Prévost Car Inc. v Her Majesty The Queen  
In Prévost Car Inc. v Her Majesty The Queen,228 a Swedish company (‘Swedish Co’) and UK company 
(‘UK Co’) (collectively referred to as ‘the shareholders’) acquired the shares of a Canadian car 
manufacturing company (‘Prévost’), which they held via a Dutch holding company that had no physical 
office or employees in the Netherlands and held no assets other than the interest in Prévost. The 
shareholders entered into a dividend policy in terms whereof at least 80% of Prévost’s net profit retained 
after tax would be distributed to them, subject to the larger group’s capital requirements (‘dividend 
policy’). The Tax Court of Canada (‘TCC’) was called upon to determine whether dividends paid by 
Prévost to the Dutch holding company were subject to Canadian withholding tax at the domestic 
statutory rate of 25%,229 or the reduced rate of 6% (later 5%) pursuant to the Canada/Netherlands DTA. 
This question depended exclusively on whether or not the Dutch holding company was the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of the dividend.  













In determining the meaning of the term ‘beneficial owner’ for purposes of the Canada/Netherlands DTA, 
the TCC made the following remarks: 
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 The ‘beneficial owner’ of a dividend is the person who:230 
o ‘receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment’; 
o ‘assumes the risk and control of the dividend’; 
o ‘enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership’; 
o ‘is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the dividend income’; 
o ‘could do with the dividend what he or she desires’. 
 The shareholders of a corporation are not automatically the ‘beneficial owners’ of the assets or 
income earned by that corporation;231 
 The shareholders of a corporation receiving a dividend will only be the ‘beneficial owners’ of 
that dividend to the extent that ‘the corporation is a conduit … and has absolutely no discretion 
as to the use or application’ of the funds or has ‘agreed to act on someone else’s behalf 
pursuant to that person’s instructions without any right to do other than what that person 
instructs it’ with regard to the dividend.232 
The TCC proceeded to find that the Dutch holding company, and not UK CO or Swedish Co, was the 
‘beneficial owner’ of the dividend, dismissing the Canadian Revenue Authority’s main contention that 
the Dutch holding company acted as a mere ‘conduit’ or ‘funnel’ for the dividends. In support of its 
decision, the Court found that the dividends received from Prévost was not ab inito destined for Swedish 
Co and UK Co (that is to say, there was no predetermined or automatic flow of the dividend from Prévost 
to the shareholders via the Dutch holding company), as (i) the Dutch holding company was not a party 
to (and therefore not bound by) the shareholders agreement that established the dividend policy, (ii) its 
Deed of Incorporation did not obligate it to declare dividends to the shareholders and (iii) the dividends 
first had to be on-declared by the Dutch holding company’s board and approved by its shareholders 
before it was paid to the shareholders.233 Accordingly, the Court held that:234 
‘PHB.V235 was the registered owner of Prévost shares. It paid for the shares. It owned 
the shares for itself. When dividends are received by PHB.V in respect of shares it 
owns, the dividends are the property of PHB.V. Until such time as the management 
board declares an interim dividend and the dividend is approved by the 
shareholders, the monies represented by the dividend continue to be property of, 
and is owned solely by, PHB.V. The dividends are an asset of PHB.V and are 
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available to its creditors, if any. No other person other than PHB.V has an interest in 
the dividends received from Prévost. PHB.V can use the dividends as it wishes and 
is not accountable to its shareholders except by virtue of the laws of the Netherlands. 
Volvo236 and Henlys237 only obtain a right to dividends that are properly declared and 
paid by PHB.V.’ 
 
Velcro Canada Inc v The Queen 
In Velcro Canada Inc v The Queen,238 the TCC had to determine whether royalties paid by a Canadian 
company to a Dutch holding company were subject to Canadian withholding tax at the domestic 
statutory rate of 25%, or the reduced rate of 10% pursuant to the Canada/Netherlands DTA. This 
question depended exclusively on whether or not the Dutch holding company was the’ beneficial owner’ 
of the royalty payment.   
In that case, Velcro Canada Inc, a Canadian resident company (‘VCI’) paid royalties to Velcro Industries 
BV, a Dutch resident company (‘VIBV’), for the use of the Velcro brand and fastener technology in 
Canada pursuant to a Licence Agreement entered into in 1987. At that stage, VCI withheld and remitted 
tax on the royalty payments to VIBV at the reduced rate of 10%, based on the fact that VIBV was a 
Dutch resident and Article 12(2) of the Canada/Netherlands DTA applied. However, during 1995 the 
larger Velcro group embarked on a restructure in terms whereof VIBV became a resident of Netherlands 
Antilles. As no treaty existed between Canada and the Netherlands Antilles, any royalties paid by VCI 
to VIBV would be subject to withholding tax at the domestic statutory rate of 25% in Canada. 
Accordingly, VIBV assigned its rights and obligations under the License Agreement to Velcro Holdings 
BV, a Dutch resident company (‘VHBV’). In consideration, VHBV agreed to pay VIBV an arm’s length 
percentage of the net royalties received from VCI within 30 days of receipt thereof. As a result, any 
future royalty payments by VCI pursuant to the License Agreement (now made to VHBV) would continue 
to be subject to withholding tax at the reduced rate of 10% pursuant to the Canada/Netherlands DTA.239 
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In determining whether VHBV was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalty payments, as submitted by VCI, 
the Court applied the so-called ‘beneficial owners test’ as enunciated in Prévost and took into account 
the following factors: 
 who had possession of the payment; 
 who had the right to use and enjoyment of the payment;  
 who assumed economic risk in respect of the payment; 
 who had control of the payment. 
Based on these factors, the Court found that VHBV was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalties, for the 
following reasons: 
 
‘Possession’ and ‘use and enjoyment’ 
 
 VHBV owned the account wherein the royalties were deposited; 
 VHBV was entitled to the interest on the royalties; 
 VHBV’s cash flow statements showed that the royalty payments were not segregated from, but 
were co-mingled with, VHBV’s other monies; 
 in terms of the License Agreement, VHBV was in no way prevented from using the royalties; 
 VHBV utilised its funds (a portion of which was made up of the royalties) on an operational 













‘Risk’ and ‘control’ 
 
 VHBV assumed the risk of currency fluctuations in that the royalties were received in Canadian 
Dollars and then converted into US or Dutch currency; 
 the royalties were at risk of seizure to satisfy VHBV’s creditors, without preference to VIBV’s 
claim; 
 no agreement indemnified VHBV against any risks and/or exposure arising from the royalty 
payments. 
The Court further found that VHBV simply had certain contractual obligations with respect to monies it 
contractually owed to VIBV. It held that, since VHBV had a semblance of discretion (as limited as it 
might have been) with regards to the royalties, there was ‘no predetermined or automatic flow through’ 
of the royalties to VIBV. This, the Court held, barred it from piercing the corporate veil and finding that 
VIBV was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the royalties, as it is only when there is ‘“absolutely no discretion” 
that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil’.240 
Accordingly, it was found, with reference to the Prévost case, that since the agreement did not 
automatically pass on dividends or royalties to VIBV, without any discretion on the part of VHBV, VIBV’s 
beneficial rights cannot be said to ‘shift the beneficial ownership of the payment over to the third 
party’.241  
 
ZAO Votek Mobile and OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom 
In the ZAO Votek Mobile242 and OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom243 cases, the Russian Tax 
Inspectorate contended that two Russian subsidiaries of a Swedish company which paid dividends to 
their Swedish parent company were not entitled to apply the reduced rate provided for in the 
Russian/Swedish treaty in respect of their obligation to withhold dividends tax, on the basis that the 
Swedish company was not the ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividend. 
In both cases, the Court ruled that the Swedish company was the ‘beneficial owner’ of the dividends, 
as the entire amount of the dividends was not on-distributed by the Swedish company to its shareholder. 
Additionally, in the OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom case, there was sufficient evidence indicating that 
the Swedish company: 
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 conducted its own business activities, in respect of which it received income and incurred 
certain expenses; 
 used the income received from its Russian subsidiary in its financing and investment 
activities; 
 had management that made independent decisions regarding the distribution of dividends to 
its shareholders. 
 
Severstal PAO and OOO TD Petelino 
Conversely, in the cases of Severstal PAO244 and OOO TD Petelino,245 the Courts ruled in favour of the 
Tax Inspectorate’s argument that the reduced rate of withholding tax provided for in the Russian/Cyprus 
treaty could not be applied due to the fact that the Cypriot companies which received the income (in the 
former instance, in the form of dividends and in the latter case, in the form of royalties) from Russia 
were ‘conduit’ companies and did not have an actual right to the income. 
In Severstal PAO, the Court’s ruling was based on the fact that: 
 the Cypriot companies made dividend payments soon after receiving dividends from the 
Russian company; 
 the shares in the Russian company were the Cypriot companies’ only asset and dividends on 
those shares made up 99% of their income; 
 the Cypriot companies themselves did not have the right to alienate their interests in the 
Russian company, as the BVI-registered owners of the Cypriot companies had the right to make 
that decision. 
In OOO TD Petelino, the Court went so far as to find that a Bermudian company, who was the owner 
of a trademark, was the ‘beneficial owner’ of royalties paid by a Russian company to a Cypriot 
intermediary company in respect of that trade mark pursuant to a sub-licensing agreement, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Cypriot intermediary company ostensibly conducted genuine business 
operations in Cyprus. 
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Indofood International Finance Limited v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA London Branch246 
The case involved a dispute between an Indonesian company, Indofood International Finance Limited 
(‘Indofood’) and J.P. Morgan (who acted on behalf of various financers) regarding the termination of 
loan notes and was heard in the UK by virtue of a UK governing law clause in the loan notes at issue. 
In that case, PT Indofood Sukses Makmur TBK (‘PTISM’) needed to obtain financing and decided to do 
so via a Mauritian subsidiary, namely Indofood. In terms of the funding structure, Indofood acquired 
interest-bearing funding from various financers in the form of loan notes and on-lent the funds to PTISM 
on an interest-bearing basis. Typically, interest payments by PTISM would have been subject to 
withholding tax on interest at a rate of 20% in Indonesia. However, in terms of the Indonesia/Mauritius 
DTA the withholding tax on the interest payments terms of the loan with Indofood was subject to a 
reduced rate of 10%. Interest payments by Indofood to the various financers were not subject to any 
withholding tax. 
In terms of the loan agreements, Indofood had the option to settle the loans in full if the tax rate on 
interest should ever be increased, unless reasonable measures could be taken to avoid the increased 
tax rate. 
Subsequently, Indonesia revoked its DTA with Mauritius, resulting in the interest repayment by PTISM 
to Indofood being subject to Indonesian withholding tax at the rate of 20% (instead of the reduced rate 
of 10%). Indofood accordingly sought to exercise its right to early redemption of the loans. The various 
lenders, however, disputed Indofood’s right on the basis that a reasonable measure existed to avoid 
the increased tax rate. According to the lenders, this measure simply entailed the interposition of a 
Dutch company (the ‘Dutch SPV’) between PTISM and Indofood, the novation to the Dutch SPV of the 
loan notes owed by Indofood and the assignment to the Dutch SPV of ownership of the debt owed by 
PTISM to Indofood. Simply put, the Dutch SPV would be incorporated and simply step into the shoes 
of Indofood; and the parties would qualify for a reduced withholding tax rate on interest of 10% in terms 
of the Netherlands/Indonesia DTA. Indofood took the view that the proposal would likely not succeed 
and continued to seek redemption of the loan notes, resulting in the ensuing litigation. 
In order for PTISM to qualify for the reduced rate in terms of Article 11.2 of the Indonesia/Netherlands 
DTA, the Dutch SPV would have had to be the ‘beneficial owner’ of the interest payable by PTISM. 
Accordingly, the Court (amongst other things) had to determine whether the Dutch SPV would have 
constituted the ‘beneficial owner’ of the interest. 
In its dictum, the Court held, with reference to a statement by the Director General of Income Tax in 
Indonesia, that ‘the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the formal owner who 
does not have the full privilege to directly benefit from the income’.247 
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Considering that the same rights and obligations that applied to Indofood would mutatis mutandis apply 
to the Dutch SPV in terms of the proposed ‘reasonable measure’, the Court proceeded to find that the 
Dutch SPV would not be the ‘beneficial owner’ of the interest paid by PTISM,248 for the following 
reasons:249  
 the Dutch SPV would have received exactly the same amount of interest that it would have 
been liable to pay to the investors; 
 the Dutch SPV would not have retained any margin of the interest and would not have exercised 
any control over the funds it would receive; 
 the Dutch SPV would have received payment only 1 day before it was liable to pay the investors; 
and 
 the loan agreement would have obliged the Dutch SPV to meet its interest obligations solely 
from the funds received from PTISM and prohibited the Dutch SPV from settling the interest 
from any other source of funds. 
 
  
                                                             
248 In this regard, the Indonesian Tax Authority indicated that it would not recognize the Dutch SPV as the ‘beneficial owner’ of 
the interest. 
249 Stegmann, JB. 2016. ‘Determining the impact of the 2014 OECD update to beneficial ownership in equity derivatives and 






South African cases 
Braun v Blann and Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd  [1901] 1 Ch 279. 
Botha v Fick [1995] (2) SA 750 (AD). 
Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W).  
Cooper v Boyes NO [1994] 2 All SA 475 (C). 
CSARS v Bosch [2014] ZASCA 171. 
CSARS v Marshall NO and Others (2016) ZASCA 158. 
Du Plooy NO and Others v De Hollandsche Molen Share Block Limited and Another [2016] JOL 
35101 (WCC). 
Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 (3) SA 245 (A), 251C-D. 
ITC 1192 35 SATC 213. 
ITC 1859 74 SATC 213. 
ITC 1893 79 SATC 159. 
Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion De Mercadeo Agricola [1976] 4 All SA 300 (A). 
Letseng Diamonds Ltd v JCI Ltd; Trinity Management (Pty) Ltd v Investec Bank Ltd 2007 (5) SA 564 
(W). 
LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments Ltd [1974] 1 SA 747 (A). 
Lynn & Main Inc v Brits Community Sandworks CC [2009] 1 All SA 116 (SCA). 
May and Others v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe [1985] 4 All SA 129 (ZH). 
Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC). 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 




RTCC v CSARS [2016] ZATC 5.  
Simon NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others [1998] 4 All SA 573 (A). 
Sino West Shipping Co. Limited v Nyk-Hinode Line Limited [2013] ZAKZDHC 7. 
Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en 'n ander v Booyens [2001] 3 All SA 536 (A). 
Smyth v Investec Bank Limited 2017 JDR 1709 (SCA). 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others 1980 (2) SA 175 (T). 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another v Ocean Commodities Inc and Others [1983] 1 All SA 
145 (A). 
Tigon Limited v Bestyet Investments (Proprietary) Limited [2015] JOL 33667 (N). 
The Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T).  
Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd [2006] SCA 160 (RSA). 
 
Canadian cases 
Prévost Car Inc. v Her Majesty The Queen 2008 TCC 231. 
Velcro Canada Inc v The Queen 2012 TCC 57. 
 
Russian cases 
OAO Sankt-Petersburg Telecom Decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court of 16 June 2015 on Case 
No. A40-187121/14. 
OOO TD Petelino Decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court of 8 May 2015 on Case No. A40-
12815/15. 
Severstal PAO Decision of the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow of 31 October 2016 on Case 
No. А40-113217/16-107-982. 
ZAO Votek Mobile Ruling of the Nineteenth Arbitration Appeal Court of 5 June 2015 on Case No. 





UK case  




Brincker, E. 2010. The taxation principles of interest and other financial transactions (electronic 
version). LexisNexis. 
Blackman M.S., Jooste R.D., Everingham G.K, Yeats J.L., Cassim F.H.I. and de la Harpe R. 2017. 
Commentary on the Companies Act (electronic version). Juta. 
De Koker, A.P. and Williams R.C. 2017. Silke on International Tax, 2011 (electronic version). 
LexisNexis.  
Delport, P. A. and Vorster, Q. 2017. Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (electronic 
version). LexisNexis.  
 
Loose-leaf publications 




Baker, P. ‘Beneficial Ownership: After Indofood’. GITC Review 6(1), 1 - 28. 
Borrowdale, A. 1985. ‘Transfer of proprietary rights in shares’. Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 18(1), 36 – 50. 
Cassim, F.H.I. 2003. ‘The repurchase by a company of its own shares: The concept of treasury 
shares’. SALJ 120(1), 137 – 157. 
Cassim, F.H.I. 2010. The Challenge of Treasury Shares. Acta Juridica, 151 - 162. 





Jooste, R. 2009. ‘Issues relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act: notes’. 
SALJ 126(4), 627 – 650. 
Kruger, D. 2012. ‘Who is a Beneficial Owner?’. Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly 3(1), 8-17. 
Lang, M., Pistone, P. et al. 2013. ‘Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends’. IBFD Publications. 1 – 330. 
Pretorius J.T., Delport P.A., Havenga M. and Vermaas M.R. 1999. Hahlo's South African Company 
Law through the Cases. Juta & Company. 6th Edition, 1 – 680. 
Rachlitz, R. 2013. ‘Disclosure of Ownership in South African Company Law’. Stellenbosch Law 
Review 24(3), 406 – 429. 
Rossi, M. 2013. ‘An Italian Perspective on the Concept of Beneficial’. Tax Notes International 72(12), 
1133 – 1169. 
Seligson, M. 2011. ‘Share Buy-backs under the Companies Acts, The Devil is in the Detail!’. Business 
Tax & Company Law Quarterly 2(1), 1 - 15. 
Van der Linde, K. 2009. ‘The regulation of distributions to shareholders in the Companies Act 2008’. 
TSAR (3), 48 - 501. 
Van Niekerk, J. 2016. ‘Some observations regarding share redemptions under the Companies Act 71 
of 2008’. SA Mercantile Law Journal 28(1), 132 – 146. 
Vermaas, M.R. 2010. ‘Reform of the law of uncertificated securities in South African company law’. 
Acta Juridica, 87 – 116. 
 
Dissertations 
Chong, S. J. 2013. ‘The tax issues of various aspects of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’, LLM 
Dissertation, University of Pretoria. 
Engelbrecht, W.A. 2013. ‘A Critical Analysis of the Meaning of Beneficial Owner of Dividend Income 
Received by a Discretionary Trust’. M. Acc Dissertation, Stellenbosch University. 
Gondwe, R. D. 2015. ‘Incomplete Company Law Reform: The Treasury Shares Question in South 
Africa’. LLM Dissertation, University of Cape Town. 
Jansen van Vuuren, J,P. 2013. ‘A legal comparison between South African, Canadian and Australian 




Koorowlay, T. 2013. ‘The Commonalities or Divergence of the Meaning of Beneficial Owner in a 
Treaty (International) and Domestic Context’. M.Com Dissertation, University of Cape Town. 
Meyer, S.P. 2010. ‘The meaning of ‘beneficial ownership’ and the use thereof for tax treaty shopping 
and tax avoidance’. M. Com Dissertation, University of Pretoria. 
Mtwebana, K. F. 2005. ‘Towards a More Flexible Structure of the Share Capital: A comparison of the 
company law of South Africa and Switzerland with regard to current debates and developments in the 
EU’. LLM Dissertation, University of Cape Town. 
Schoon, AD. 2011. ‘The tax effect of shares-for-future services’. LLM Dissertation, University of 
Pretoria. 
Siddle, A.M., 2006. ‘Share Repurchases in South Africa: Reasons and Returns’. M.Com Dissertation, 
University of Cape Town. 
Stegmann, J.B. 2016. ‘Determining the impact of the 2014 OECD update to beneficial ownership in 
equity derivatives and financial instrument transactions’. M. Com Dissertation, University of Pretoria. 
Van der Merwe, C.P. 2015. ‘Reconsidering Distributions: A Critical Analysis of the Regulation of 
Distributions to Shareholders in the Companies Act of 2008, with Special Reference to the Solvency 
and Liquidity Requirement’. LLM Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch. 
Vermaas, M.R. 1995. ‘Aspekte van die Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg’. PhD Dissertation, University of South Africa. 
Viljoen, A. J. 2011. ‘Acquisition of Securities: Section 48 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008’. LLM 
Dissertation, University of Pretoria. 
 
Online articles 
Helmer, G. 2012. ‘Beneficial ownership – a looming disaster?’ available at 
https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/tax/tax-issue20120730.html (last visited 01/06/2017). 
Li, J. (2012). ‘Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation and the Case for Clarity’. 
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy. Research Paper No. 4/2012. Available at 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/4 (last visited 11/02/2018). 
Louw, H. 2012. ‘Dividend tax and trusts – who needs to pay?’ available at 




Van Bladel, M.L.L. 2013. ‘Commentary on OECD Model tax convention: Revised proposals 
concerning the meaning of Beneficial Owner in articles 10, 11 and 12, 19’ available at 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/BENOWNMLL_vanBladel.pdf (last visited 21/01/2018). 
Voronkova, A and Valitova, R. 2015. ‘Russia: Introducing the beneficial owner concept as part of 
Russia’s de-offshorisation initiatives’ available at 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3482221/Russia-Introducing-the-beneficial-owner-
concept-as-part-of-Russias-de-offshorisation-initiatives.html (last visited 21/01/2018). 
Towers, S. 2017. ‘Russia: Beneficial ownership case on capital gains’ available at 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/russia-beneficial-ownership-case-capital-gains-steve-towers (last 
visited on 21/01/2018). 
Kate T., Gauri S., Rupal Bansal et al. 2018. Civil Law v Common Law’ available at 
https://www.diffen.com/difference/Civil_Law_vs_Common_Law (last visited 21/01/2018). 
SARS Guides 
Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (Issue 6). Available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/ Guides/ LAPD-CGT-G01%20-
%20Comprehensive%20Guide%20to%20Capital%20Gains%20Tax%20%20External%20 Guide.pdf 
(last visited 18/01/2018). 






Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, No. 105 of 1983. 
Companies Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1999. 
Collective Investment Schemes Act, No. 45 of 2002. 
Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012. 
Income Tax Act, No. 58 of 1962. 
Marketable Securities Tax Act, No. 32 of 1948. 
Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, No. 36 of 2007. 
69 
Securities Transfer Tax Act, No. 25 of 2007. 
Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act, No. 26 of 2007. 
Stamp Duties Act, No. 77 of 1968. 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act, No. 24 of 2011. 
Uncertificated Securities Tax Act, No. 31 of 1998. 
Explanatory Memoranda 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Uncertificated Securities Tax Bill, 1998. Available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-1998-02%20-
%20%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Uncertificated%20Securities%20Tax%20Bill%201998.pdf 
(last visited 11/02/2018). 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999. Available at 
http://www.cipro.gov.za/news_events/Companies_Amendment_Bill.pdf (last visited 11/02/2018). 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 1999. Available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-1999-01%20-
%20%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Revenue%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%201999.pdf 
(last visited 11/02/2018).  








Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2011. Available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/ExplMemo/LAPD-LPrep-EM-2011-02%20-
%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20Taxation%20Laws%20Amendment%20Bill%202011.pdf (last 
visited 11/02/2018). 
